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ABSTRACT
Feng Chen: ADMISSION CONTROL AND ROUTING IN
MULTI-PRIORITY SYSTEMS
(Under the direction of Professor Vidyadhar G. Kulkarni)
We consider a manufacturer that offers two types of prioritized warranties for its
product. Type 1 warranty guarantees a shorter turnaround time than type 2 warranty.
Hence items covered by type 1 warranty receive higher priority in repair service. When
an item under warranty fails, the manufacturer sends it to one of several repair vendors
for repair, who are under contracts to provide repair service for the manufacturer.
The manufacturer pays each vendor a fixed fee per repair assignment. While an item
is at the vendor under or awaiting repair, a linear holding cost is incurred by the
vendor and a linear good-will cost is incurred by the manufacturer.
We first study the admission control problem for a single vendor that can either
accept or reject an incoming repair assignment in order to maximize its own profit.
We analyze the optimal control policies under three criteria: individual optimization,
class optimization, and social optimization. By exploiting two proof methods, value
iteration algorithm and sample path analysis, we prove that the optimal policy under
each criterion has switching-curve structure. We also compare the optimal policies
under the three criteria mentioned above and show that (i) the class-optimal pol-
icy accepts more high priority customers but fewer low priority customers than the
socially optimal policy, which has interesting socioeconomic connotation, (ii) the in-
dividually optimal policy accepts more high priority customers than the class-optimal
iii
policy, while it can accept either more or fewer low-priority customers than either of
the other two optimal policies.
We then consider the warranty repair allocation problem which the manufacturer
faces. The manufacturer’s goal is to allocate the repair work in such a way that the
total cost (including fixed cost and good-will cost) is minimized. The complexity of
the problem makes the attempt to find the optimal policy very unlikely to succeed.
Therefore, we turn our attention to heuristic routing procedures. We develop an
effective and robust index-based policy by applying a single policy improvement step
to a well-chosen static routing policy. We evaluate the index-based policy and compare
it with other heuristics via simulation.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Overview
Warranty has been playing an increasingly important role in product sales and ser-
vices. In 2004, the 25 largest manufactures in the United States spent a total of $15
billion on warranty claims. Warranty claims processing consumed 2.5% ∼ 4.5% of
revenues across all industries (Byrne [8]). It has been shown that warranty improve-
ments can not only save cost but also boost revenues, enhance customer satisfaction
and loyalty, and even drive up the product quality.
There has been a strong trend towards outsourcing various business operations
in recent years, especially in the IT industry. According to IDC (a Framingham,
Massachusetts-based market research firm), spending on IT outsourcing reached $56
billion in 2000 and $100 billion in 2005. As a major component of the manufacturing
and retail industry, warranty repair services have experienced the rising outsourcing
tide as well. Outsourcing warranty repairs offers the original equipment manufacturer
the opportunity to reduce operating cost and capital investment, focus on their core
business, increase speed to market, and faster customer response time.
Typically a manufacturer outsources repair work to several vendors, in which case
the manufacturer faces the problem of how to distribute the workload among vendors
in a cost-effective manner. The problem becomes more complicated in the presence
of priorities. Priority issue arises when the manufacturer provides different types
of warranties that specify different turnaround times. The warranty with shorter
turnaround time is given to important customers (e.g. customers that make frequent
or large purchases from the manufacturer), or sold to customers who are willing to
pay more for a shorter repair time. To meet the specified turnaround times, products
covered by a warranty that guarantees a shorter repair time are given higher priority
in repair service. Hence, the manufacturer needs to solve a multi-priority warranty
repair allocation problem.
We study two topics motivated by the problem mentioned above. The first topic
is the admission control problem for a single vendor. We assume the failed items of
each class (i.e., covered by each warranty) arrive at the vendor according to a Poisson
process. The vendor can either accept or reject each arriving item with the objective
of maximizing its own profit. The vendor receives a class-dependent reward each
time it accepts an item and pays a holding cost at a class-dependent rate while an
item is at the vendor. There is no penalty for rejecting an item. Costs and rewards
are continuously discounted. We analyze the optimal admission control policy under
three optimization criteria: individual optimization, class-optimization, and social
optimization. Our primary interest is in showing structural properties of the optimal
policies.
We first consider the case where the reward is generated at the time of joining the
repair queue in Chapter 2. Using value iteration algorithm, we prove that the optimal
policy is of threshold-type under each of the three optimization criteria mentioned
above. We also compare the optimal policies under the three criteria and show that
(i) the class-optimal policy accepts more class 1 customers but fewer class 2 customers
than the socially optimal policy, which has interesting social connotation, (ii) the indi-
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vidually optimal policy accepts more class 1 customers than the class-optimal policy,
while it can accept either more or fewer class 2 customers than either of the other two
optimal policies. We then consider the case where the reward is generated at the time
of service completion in Chapter 3. By applying sample path analysis, we show that
the switching-curve structure property still holds for the optimal policy under each
optimization criterion. We compare policies under different criteria numerically. The
numerical results imply the same relationship between different criteria as proved for
the first case.
The second topic is the dynamic routing problem for the manufacturer. Assume
the life time of each item is exponential indepent of the warranty type. Each time
an item covered under warranty fails, the manufacturer needs to decide which vendor
to send the item for repair. The manufacturer pays a vendor-dependent fixed fee for
each repair and incurs a good-will cost while an item is undergoing or waiting for
repair. Given the complexity of the problem, trying to find the optimal solution is
unrealistic. Hence we turn our attention to heuristic allocation procedures. In Chap-
ter 4, we present four heuristics that are applicable to large problems, then evaluate
and compare them using simulation. Among the four heuristics, the Generalized Join
the Shortest Queue (GJSQ) policy is of our primary interest. The GJSQ policy is
derived by applying a single policy improvement step to a judicious chosen initial
static policy. We derive closed-form expressions for the GJSQ policy. The simulation
results suggest that the GJSQ policy is robust and performs considerably better than
the other heuristics.
1.2 Literature Review
There is an extensive literature on the subject of warranty. For a comprehensive
reference, see Blischke and Murthy [7]. They discuss a variety of warranty policies
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including standard consumer product warranties such as the free replacement and pro
rata, as well as warranties used in large volume or specialized transactions. Analytical
models dealing with cost and optimization problems from both the manufacturer’s
and the buyer’s point of view are developed. Methods of collecting and analyzing
relevant data are also addressed. A literature review until 2002 is given by Murthy
and Djamaludin [34]. For recent development, among others, see Dimitrov et al. [12],
Yeh et al. [50], and Manna et al. [31].
1.2.1 Admission Control
Admission control for single class queueing systems is a well studied area. See Stidham
[43] for a survey. The first quantitative model in this area is proposed by Naor
[36], who studies an M/M/1 system with a single class of customers. He considers
undiscounted reward and cost and the objective is to maximize the long-run average
net reward per unit time. Naor considers only critical-number policies and shows
that nS ≤ nI , where nS and nI are the critical numbers for social optimization and
individual optimization, respectively. An incoming customer is accepted if the number
of existing customer is less than the critical number and rejected otherwise. Yechiali
[48] [49] proves that for GI/M/1, GI/M/s systems the socially optimal policy has
critical-number form. Thus Naor’s restriction to critical-number policies is without
loss of generality.
Naor’s result has been generalized by many authors. Among others, Knudsen [22]
considers an M/M/s queue with state-dependent net benefit. Lippman and Stidham
[28] study a birth-death process with general departure rate, random reward, with or
without discounting and for a finite or infinite time horizon. Stidham [42] considers
a GI/M/1 queue with random reward and general holding cost, with or without
discounting. For other models of admission control problem for single-class queues,
see Adiri and Yechiali [1], Stidham and Weber [44], and Rykov [40].
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Admission control for multi-class queueing systems is another important research
area. Models in this area can be classified into two categories based on whether or not
service is prioritized based on class. In models without priorities, different classes are
distinguished by different arrival rates, service rates, rewards, holding costs, etc. For
papers in this category, among others, see Miller [33], Blanc and de Waal [6], Kulkarni
and Tedijanto [25], and Nair and Bapma [35]. Among papers that consider service
priorities, Mendelson and Whang [32] study a priority pricing problem for a multi-
class M/M/1 queueing system, where each customer decides by himself whether or
not to join the system and, if join, at what priority level. Hassin [19] studies a bidding
mechanism for determining priorities in a GI/M/1 queue without balking. Ha [18]
considers the production control problem in a make-to-stock production system with
two prioritized customer classes.
To the best of our knowledge, the admission control problem for a multi-class
queue with predetermined priorities and the objective of minimizing expected total
discounted cost has not been studied. Besides the widely used individual optimization
and social optimization, we propose a new optimization criterion: class optimization.
Using two proof methods: value iteration algorithm and sample path analysis, we
show that the optimal policies have threshold-type structure. We also compare be-
tween different optimal policies.
1.2.2 Warranty Repair Routing
We categorize warranty repair routing problems from the following four aspects.
(i) Based on the priority levels, we have either single-priority problems or multi-
priority problems. In the single-priority case, the repair service at each vendor
is provided on a first-in, first-served basis. In the multi-priority case, the repair
service is provided based on a predetermined priority policy.
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(ii) Based on the number of items under warranty, we have either fixed-population
problems, or variable-population problems. Fixed-population problem arises
when we are dealing with warranty repairs for a batch of items sold at once, in
which case no items enter or leave the warranty population of interest during
the warranty period. More often, the items are sold in a continuous fashion.
Thus the number of items under warranty increases when a new sale occurs and
decreases when the warranty expires on an existing item, in which case we have
a variable-population problem.
(iii) Based on the assignment rule, we can use either assign-at-purchase policies or
assign-at-failure policies. The former requires an item to be assigned to a vendor
at the time of purchase and sent to that vendor for repair each time it fails. This
can be done by printing the repair vendor’s phone number on the warranty card
and instructing customers to call that number for repair services. The latter
allows the items to be assigned to different vendors at the time of failure. In
this case, a routing center’s phone number is printed on the warranty card. A
repair vendor’s information is provided when the customer calls with a request
for repair.
(iv) Based on the available information, the routing policy we use can be either
state-independent, partially state-dependent, or fully state-dependent. State-
independent policies do not use any real-time information of the system, i.e.,
the same rule is applied to every assignment. Partially state-dependent policies
use only the real-time information of the warranty population, which includes
the number of items under each type of warranty and the remaining warranty
length of each item. This information can be easily collected by keeping a record
of the purchases made in the past W time, where W is the warranty length.
If the warranty periods are assumed to be i.i.d. exponential random variables,
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then only the warranty population size is necessary. Fully state-dependent poli-
cies use real-time information of both the warranty population and the vendors.
Real-time information of vendors means the number of items at each vendor at
the time of each failure. Collecting this information requires real-time commu-
nication between the manufacturer and the vendors, which may need a more
complicated information system and cost extra.
The warranty repair allocation problem has the simplest structure when consid-
ering single-priority and fixed-population. In this case, the assign-at-purchase model
reduces to a resource allocation problem with separable objective function. Note
that only state-independent policies are applicable in the assign-at-purchase model.
This problem has been extensively studied in the literature. When the objective is
convex, a simple greedy algorithm first proposed by Gross [17] can be used to solve
the problem optimally. See Ibaraki and Katoh [21] for a comprehensive reference
for the resource allocation problems. Opp et al. [37] discuss the application of the
greedy algorithm to the warranty repair allocation problem. Ding and Glazebrook
[13] consider a goodwill cost model that takes explicit account of the delays expe-
rienced by customers. They show that simple greedy approaches work well. The
assign-at-failure model for single-priority and fixed-population problem is studied by
Opp et al. [37]. They argue that optimally solving real-life size problems is numeri-
cally intractable. They develop index-based, fully state-dependent heuristic policies
to find near-optimal solutions.
When priorities are considered, the objective function is no longer separable.
Buczkowski et al. [9] study the assign-at-purchase model for multi-priority, fixed-
population problems. They formulate the problem as a minimum cost network flow
problem and provide an efficient algorithm to solve it.
We are interested in the multi-priority, variable-population problem, and the
assign-at-failure policies. Given the difficulty of the problem even without consid-
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ering priority and finite constant warranty length (see Opp et al. [37]), seeking the
optimal solution is very unlikely to be successful. Hence we focus on constructing
heuristic policies.
We first simplify the problem by assuming that the number of functioning items
under warranty of each type is a constant. Therefore, failures occur according to
Poisson processes. The original warranty repair allocation problem reduces to the
problem of routing items arriving according to independent Poisson streams to several
vendors where service is provided according to a fixed priority policy. A general model
of this situation is studied by Ansell et al. [3]. They develop an index-based dynamic
routing heuristic by applying a single policy improvement step to an initial static
policy (see also Krishnan [23] and Tijms [45] for this approach). They name the
resulting index-based heuristic “Generalized Join the Shortest Queue”(GJSQ) policy.
The simplified version of our problem is a special case of the model studied by
Ansell et al. [3] (we consider two generic classes and no dedicated classes), except that
we allow a station-dependent fixed cost per assignment, which is not considered by
Ansell et al. [3]. We adapt their approach and derive tractable closed-form expressions
for the indices, which are given as a solution to an infinite set of recursive equations
in Ansell et al. [3]. We evaluate the GJSQ policy and compare it with three other
heuristics using simulation. The simulation results show that, although the GJSQ
policy is derived based on a simplified model, it works well on the original problem
and outperforms the other heuristics.
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Chapter 2
Admission Control: Value
Iteration Approach
2.1 Problem Description
We study the admission control problem at a single vendor in this chapter. We model
the single vendor under consideration as an M/M/1 queueing system serving two
classes of customers. Class 1 customers have preemptive resume priority over class 2
customers. Within each class, the service is provided on a first-come, first-served basis.
Class i customers arrive according to a Poisson process with parameter λi, i = 1, 2.
Each customer requires an i.i.d. exp(µ) service time (same for both classes). The
system is controlled by accepting or rejecting arriving customers. There is a reward
of ri associated with accepting a class i customer. An accepted class i customer
generates a waiting cost of hi per unit time spent in the system. All rewards and
costs are continuously discounted with rate α > 0. The goal is to minimize the
expected total discounted net cost.
Priority issue arises in many other queueing systems. For example, internet traffic
protocols assign higher priority to data packages that require real-time transmission
(e.g. live audio and video) and lower priority to delay-insensitive packages (e.g. e-
mails and file transmission). Service queues may give VIP customers higher priority
over ordinary customers. In hospitals, patients in critical conditions receive higher
priority in treatment over non-critical patients. Admission control problem in these
kinds of multi-priority queues can be modeled by the framework presented here.
We analyze the optimal control policies for such a system under 3 criteria: in-
dividual optimization, class optimization, and social optimization. Under individual
optimization, each customer obtains the reward and pays the waiting cost by himself.
A customer makes decision based on the objective of minimizing his own expected to-
tal discounted net cost. Under class optimization, there is a controller for each class.
The controller of class i obtains the reward and pays the waiting cost generated by
each class i customer. He decides whether to accept an arriving class i customer or
not based on the objective of minimizing the expected total discounted net cost in-
curred by all class i customers. Under social optimization, there is a single controller
for the whole system. The system controller obtains the reward and pays the waiting
cost generated by every customer. He decides whether to accept an arriving customer
or not based on the objective of minimizing the expected total discounted net cost
incurred by all customers.
2.2 Individual Optimization
We consider individual optimization in this section. Clearly, the individually optimal
policy for an arriving customer is to join the system if and only if his expected
discounted net cost is less than or equal to zero.
Denote the system state by (i, j), where i is the number of class 1 customers in
the system and j is the number of class 2 customers in the system. We need the
following lemma to derive the main result in Theorem 1.
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Lemma 1. Let X(t) be the number of customers in a M/M/1/k queue at time t
with arrival rate λ and service rate µ. Let T = min{t ≥ 0 : X(t) = 0} and define
φi(α) = E(e
−αT |X(0) = i). Then, φi(α) is given by
φi(α) =
ui1u
k−1
2 (u2(α + µ)− µ)− u
i
2u
k−1
1 (u1(α + µ)− µ)
uk−12 (u2(α + µ)− µ)− u
k−1
1 (u1(α + µ)− µ)
, i = 0, . . . , k, (2.1)
where
u1 =
1
2λ1
(α + λ1 + µ +
√
(α + λ1 + µ)2 − 4λ1µ),
u2 =
1
2λ1
(α + λ1 + µ−
√
(α + λ1 + µ)2 − 4λ1µ).
(2.2)
Proof. {X(t), t ≥ 0} is a birth-death process on state space S = {0, 1, . . . , k}. By
Theorem 6.21 of Kulkarni [24], {φi(α)} is the solution to
φ0(α) = 1,
µφi−1(α)− (α + λ1 + µ)φi(α) + λ1φi+1(α) = 0, i = 1, 3, . . . , k − 1,
µφk−1(α)− (α + µ)φk(α) = 0.
(2.3)
Solving the above system of equations yields (2.1).
Theorem 1. Under the individual optimization criterion, an arriving class 1 cus-
tomer who sees the system in state (i, j) joins the queue if and only if i < LI1, where
LI1 =


∞, if h1 ≤ αr1
blog(1− αr1
h1
)/ log µ
µ+α
c, if h1 > αr1.
(2.4)
An arriving class 2 customer who sees the system in state (i, j) joins the queue if and
only if j < LI2(i), where
LI2(i) =


∞, if h2 ≤ αr2
blog h2−αr2
h2φi(α)
/ log βc, if h2 > αr2, i ≤ L
I
1
b(log h2−αr2
h2φLI
1
(α)
+ (i− LI1)(log
µ+α
µ
))/ log βc, if h2 > αr2, i > L
I
1,
(2.5)
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where φi(α) is given in (2.1), β =
µ
α+µ+λ1(1−φ1(α))
, bxc is the largest integer less than
or equal to x. Furthermore, LI2(i) is decreasing in i.
Proof. First consider class 1 customers. Denote the sojourn time of a class 1 customer
who joins the system in state (i, j) by X(i, j). Since class 1 customers have preemptive
priority over class 2 customers, we have
X(i, j) = X1 + X2 + · · ·+ Xi+1,
where Xk, k = 1, 2, . . . , i + 1 are i.i.d. exp(µ) service times. So the class 1 customer’s
expected total discounted cost is
E(
∫ X(i,j)
0
h1e
−αtdt) =
h1
α
(1− (
µ
µ + α
)i+1).
Therefore, he joins the queue if and only if
h1
α
(1− (
µ
µ + α
)i+1) ≤ r1, (2.6)
which is equivalent to i < LI1, where L
I
1 is defined in (2.4).
Now consider class 2 customers. Denote the sojourn time of a class 2 customer
who joins the system in state (i, j) by Y (i, j). We can decompose Y (i, j) into 3
periods. Period 1, denoted by T1, is the time period for serving the first i−L
I
1 class 1
customers, if i > LI1. Period 1 has length 0 if i ≤ L
I
1. Note that no class 1 arrivals will
be accepted during this period. Period 2, denoted by T2, is the server’s busy period
for serving the remaining class 1 customers and the class 1 customers joining the
system during this period, which ends when the first class 2 customer starts receiving
service. Period 3, denoted by T3, is the time period for serving the j + 1 class 2
customers and the class 1 customers joining the system during this period.
Consider period T1 first. If i ≤ L
I
1, T1 has length 0, thus E(e
−αT1) = 1. If i > LI1,
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T1 is the sum of i− L
I
1 i.i.d. exp(µ) service times. Thus E(e
−αT1) = ( µ
α+µ
)i−L
I
1 .
From Lemma 1 we know the LST of T2 is given by (2.1) with k = L
I
1.
Consider period T3. T3 =
∑j+1
k=1 Zk, where Zk is the time period for serving the
kth class 2 customer and the class 1 customers joining the system during this period.
Let β = E(e−αZ1). Using first-step analysis, one can show that β satisfies
β =
µ + λ1
α + µ + λ1
(
µ
µ + λ1
+
λ1
µ + λ1
φ1(α)β).
Solving for β, we have
β =
µ
α + µ + λ1(1− φ1(α))
.
Since {Zk} are i.i.d., we have
E(e−αT3) = (E(e−αZ1))j+1 = βj+1.
Thus
E(e−αY (i,j)) = E(e−αT1)E(e−αT2)E(e−αT3) = (
µ
α + µ
)max{0,i−L
I
1
}φmin{i,LI
1
}(α)β
j+1.
Therefore, the expected total discounted cost for a class 2 customer joining the system
in state (i, j) is
E(
∫ Y (i,j)
0
h2e
−αtdt) =
h2
α
(1− (
µ
α + µ
)max{0,i−L
I
1
}φmin{i,LI
1
}(α)β
j+1).
He will join the system if and only if
h2
α
(1− (
µ
α + µ
)max{0,i−L
I
1
}φmin{i,LI
1
}(α)β
j+1) ≤ r2,
which is equivalent to j < LI2(i), where L
I
2(i) is defined in (2.5).
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Since T is stochastically increasing in i, φi(α) is decreasing in i. Thus L
I
2(i) is
decreasing in i.
2.3 Class Optimization
We consider class optimization in this section. There is a controller for each class.
The controller of class i decides whether to accept an arriving class i customer or not
based on the objective of minimizing the expected total discounted net cost incurred
by all class i customers, i = 1, 2.
Consider the optimal policy for the controller of class 1 first. This is the stan-
dard single-class admission control problem studied by many authors. Among others,
Stidham [42] considers a GI/M/1 queue with random rewards and general holding
cost and shows that the optimal policy is of critical-number form. As a special case,
we have
Theorem 2. The optimal policy for the controller of class 1 is a threshold policy,
i.e., there exists a constant LC1 such that an arriving class 1 customer is accepted if
and only if i < LC1 .
Now consider the optimal policy for the controller of class 2. Assume that the
controller of class 1 applies his optimal policy and the controller of class 2 knows
that. Let v(i, j) be the minimum expected total discounted cost for the controller
of class 2 with initial state (i, j). Following Lippman [27], we uniformize the process
by defining the uniform rate Λ = λ1 + λ2 + µ. Assuming, without loss of generality,
Λ + α = 1, the optimality equations can be written as
v(i, j) = Tv(i, j) = C(j) + λ1T1v(i, j) + λ2T2v(i, j) + µT3v(i, j), (2.7)
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where
C(j) = h2j, (2.8)
T1v(i, j) =


v(i + 1, j), i < LC1
v(i, j), i ≥ LC1 ,
(2.9)
T2v(i, j) = min{−r2 + v(i, j + 1), v(i, j)}, (2.10)
and
T3v(i, j) =


v(i− 1, j), i ≥ 1, j ≥ 0
v(0, j − 1), i = 0, j ≥ 1
v(0, 0), i = 0, j = 0.
(2.11)
Let V be the set of functions such that if v ∈ V, then
• v is monotonically increasing in i, i.e.,
v(i, j) ≤ v(i + 1, j), (2.12)
• v is monotonically increasing in j, i.e.,
v(i, j) ≤ v(i, j + 1), (2.13)
• v is supermodular, i.e.,
v(i, j + 1) + v(i + 1, j) ≤ v(i, j) + v(i + 1, j + 1), (2.14)
• v is diagonally dominant in j, i.e.,
v(i, j + 1) + v(i + 1, j + 1) ≤ v(i + 1, j) + v(i, j + 2). (2.15)
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It is worth noting that if v ∈ V, then v is convex in j, i.e.,
v(i, j + 1)− v(i, j) ≤ v(i, j + 2)− v(i, j + 1). (2.16)
This follows by adding inequalities (2.14) and (2.15).
We have the following properties of the operators T1, T2, and T3.
Lemma 2. If v ∈ V, then T1v ∈ V.
Proof.
(a) For (2.12), if i ≤ LC1 − 2, then
T1v(i, j) = v(i + 1, j) ≤ v(i + 2, j) = T1v(i + 1, j).
If i = LC1 − 1, then
T1v(i, j) = v(i + 1, j) = T1v(i + 1, j).
If i ≥ LC1 , then
T1v(i, j) = v(i, j) ≤ v(i + 1, j) = T1v(i + 1, j).
(b) For (2.13), if i ≤ LC1 − 1, then
T1v(i, j) = v(i + 1, j) ≤ v(i + 1, j + 1) = T1v(i, j + 1).
If i ≥ LC1 , then
T1v(i, j) = v(i, j) ≤ v(i, j + 1) = T1v(i, j + 1).
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(c) For (2.14), if i ≤ LC1 − 2, then
T1v(i, j + 1) + T1v(i + 1, j) = v(i + 1, j + 1) + v(i + 2, j)
≤ v(i + 1, j) + v(i + 2, j + 1)
= T1v(i, j) + T1v(i + 1, j + 1),
where the inequality follows from (2.14) with i replaced by i + 1.
If i = LC1 − 1, then
T1v(i, j + 1) + T1v(i + 1, j) = v(i + 1, j + 1) + v(i + 1, j)
= T1v(i, j) + T1v(i + 1, j + 1).
If i ≥ LC1 , then
T1v(i, j + 1) + T1v(i + 1, j) = v(i, j + 1) + v(i + 1, j)
≤ v(i, j) + v(i + 1, j + 1)
= T1v(i, j) + T1v(i + 1, j + 1).
(d) For (2.15), if i ≤ LC1 − 2, then
T1v(i, j + 1) + T1v(i + 1, j + 1) = v(i + 1, j + 1) + v(i + 2, j + 1)
≤ v(i + 2, j) + v(i + 1, j + 2)
= T1v(i + 1, j) + T1v(i, j + 2),
where the inequality follows from (2.15) with i replaced by i + 1.
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If i = LC1 − 1, then
T1v(i, j + 1) + T1v(i + 1, j + 1) = v(i + 1, j + 1) + v(i + 1, j + 1)
≤ v(i + 1, j) + v(i + 1, j + 2)
= T1v(i + 1, j) + T1v(i, j + 2),
where the inequality follows from (2.16) with i replaced by i + 1.
If i ≥ LC1 , then
T1v(i, j + 1) + T1v(i + 1, j + 1) = v(i, j + 1) + v(i + 1, j + 1)
≤ v(i + 1, j) + v(i, j + 2)
= T1v(i + 1, j) + T1v(i, j + 2).
Lemma 3. If v ∈ V, then T2v ∈ V.
Proof.
(a) For (2.12), denote by a the minimizing action in T2v(i+1, j), where action 0 (1)
refers to rejecting (accepting) a customer, i.e., T2v(i + 1, j) = min{−r2 + v(i +
1, j+1), v(i+1, j)} = v(i+1, j), if a = 0, and T2v(i+1, j) = −r2+v(i+1, j+1),
if a = 1.
If a = 0, then
T2v(i, j) = min{−r2 + v(i, j + 1), v(i, j)} ≤ v(i, j) ≤ v(i + 1, j) = T2v(i + 1, j).
If a = 1, then
T2v(i, j) ≤ −r2 + v(i, j + 1) ≤ −r2 + v(i + 1, j + 1) = T2v(i + 1, j).
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(b) For (2.13), the proof is similar to (a).
(c) For (2.14), denote by a1 (a2) the minimizing action in T2v(i, j) (T2v(i+1, j+1)).
If a1 = a2 = 0, then
T2v(i, j + 1) + T2v(i + 1, j)
= min{−r2 + v(i, j + 2), v(i, j + 1)}+ min{−r2 + v(i + 1, j + 1), v(i + 1, j)}
≤ v(i, j + 1) + v(i + 1, j) ≤ v(i, j) + v(i + 1, j + 1) = T2v(i, j) + T2v(i + 1, j + 1),
where the second inequality follows from (2.14).
The case where a1 = a2 = 1 can be proved similarly.
If a1 = 1, a2 = 0, then
T2v(i, j + 1) + T2v(i + 1, j) ≤ v(i, j + 1)− r2 + v(i + 1, j + 1)
= T2v(i, j) + T2v(i + 1, j + 1).
If a1 = 0, a2 = 1, following the convention that an arriving customer is accepted
when the system performance is indifferent between accepting and rejecting this
customer, we have
v(i, j) < −r2 + v(i, j + 1), −r2 + v(i + 1, j + 2) ≤ v(i + 1, j + 1).
The sum of the these two inequalities gives us
v(i, j) + v(i + 1, j + 2) < v(i, j + 1) + v(i + 1, j + 1). (2.17)
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Replacing j by j + 1 in (2.14), we get
v(i, j + 2) + v(i + 1, j + 1) ≤ v(i, j + 1) + v(i + 1, j + 2). (2.18)
Summing up (2.14), (2.15) and (2.18), we get
v(i, j + 1) + v(i + 1, j + 1) ≤ v(i, j) + v(i + 1, j + 2),
which is a contradiction to (2.17). Therefore, the case where a1 = 0, a2 = 1
does not exist.
(d) For (2.15), denote by a1 (a2) the minimizing action in T2v(i+1, j) (T2v(i, j+2)).
If a1 = a2 = 0, then
T2v(i, j + 1) + T2v(i + 1, j + 1)
= min{−r2 + v(i, j + 2), v(i, j + 1)}+ min{−r2 + v(i + 1, j + 2), v(i + 1, j + 1)}
≤ v(i, j + 1) + v(i + 1, j + 1)}
≤ v(i + 1, j) + v(i, j + 2) = T2v(i + 1, j) + T2v(i, j + 2),
where the second inequality follows from (2.15).
The case where a1 = a2 = 1 can be proved similarly.
If a1 = 1, a2 = 0, then
T2v(i, j + 1) + T2v(i + 1, j + 1)
≤ −r2 + v(i, j + 2) + v(i + 1, j + 1) = T2v(i + 1, j) + T2v(i, j + 2).
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If a1 = 0, a2 = 1, then
v(i + 1, j) < −r2 + v(i + 1, j + 1), −r2 + v(i, j + 3) ≤ v(i, j + 2).
The sum of the above two inequalities gives us
v(i + 1, j) + v(i, j + 3) < v(i + 1, j + 1) + v(i, j + 2). (2.19)
Replacing j by j + 1 in (2.15), we have
v(i, j + 2) + v(i + 1, j + 2) ≤ v(i + 1, j + 1) + v(i, j + 3). (2.20)
Summing up (2.15), (2.18), and (2.20), we get
v(i + 1, j + 1) + v(i, j + 2) ≤ v(i + 1, j) + v(i, j + 3),
which is a contradiction to (2.19). Therefore the case where a1 = 0, a2 = 1 does
not exist.
Lemma 4. If v ∈ V, then T3v ∈ V.
Proof.
(a) For (2.12), if i ≥ 1, j ≥ 0, then
T3v(i, j) = v(i− 1, j) ≤ v(i, j) = T3v(i + 1, j).
If i = 0, j ≥ 1, then
T3v(0, j) = v(0, j − 1) ≤ v(0, j) = T3v(1, j).
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If i = 0, j = 0, then
T3v(0, 0) = v(0, 0) = T3v(1, 0).
(b) For (2.13), the proof is similar to (a).
(c) For (2.14), if i ≥ 1, j ≥ 0, then
T3v(i, j + 1) + T3v(i + 1, j) = v(i− 1, j + 1) + v(i, j)
≤ v(i− 1, j) + v(i, j + 1) = T3v(i, j) + T3v(i + 1, j + 1),
where the inequality follows from (2.14) with i replaced by i− 1.
If i = 0, j ≥ 1, then
T3v(0, j + 1) + T3v(1, j) = v(0, j) + v(0, j)
≤ v(0, j − 1) + v(0, j + 1) = T3v(0, j) + T3v(1, j + 1),
where the inequality follows from (2.16) with j replaced by j − 1 and i = 0.
If i = 0, j = 0, then
T3v(0, 1) + T3v(1, 0) = v(0, 0) + v(0, 0)
≤ v(0, 0) + v(0, 1) = T3v(0, 0) + T3v(1, 1).
(d) For (2.15), if i ≥ 1, j ≥ 0, then
T3v(i, j + 1) + T3v(i + 1, j + 1) = v(i− 1, j + 1) + v(i, j + 1)
≤ v(i, j) + v(i− 1, j + 2) = T3v(i + 1, j) + T3v(i, j + 2),
where the inequality follows from (2.15) with i replaced by i− 1.
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If i = 0, j ≥ 1, then
T3v(0, j + 1) + T3v(1, j + 1) = v(0, j) + v(0, j + 1) = T3v(1, j) + T3v(0, j + 2).
If i = 0, j = 0, then
T3v(0, 1) + T3v(1, 1) = v(0, 0) + v(0, 1) = T3v(1, 0) + T3v(0, 2).
The above lemmas lead to the following theorem.
Theorem 3. The optimal value function v ∈ V.
Proof. Let v0(i, j) = 0, ∀(i, j) ∈ S, and define, for n ≥ 0, vn+1(i, j) = C(j) +
λ1T1vn(i, j) + λ2T2vn(i, j) + µT3vn(i, j). Since α > 0, we know that vn → v as
n →∞. (See Theorem 6.3.1 of Puterman [39].)
It is easy to see that C(j) ∈ V. Lemma 2, 3, 4 show that if vn ∈ V then Tivn ∈ V
for i = 1, 2, 3. Clearly v0 ∈ V and the above observation yields that if vn ∈ V then
vn+1 ∈ V. Hence, by induction, vn ∈ V for all n. Therefore, by taking limits, v ∈ V,
thus proving the theorem
Now we are ready to prove the structural properties of the class-optimal policy
for class 2 customers.
Theorem 4. The optimal policy for the controller of class 2 is characterized by a
monotonically decreasing switching curve, i.e., for each i ≥ 0, there exists a threshold
LC2 (i), such that a class 2 arrival in state (i, j) is accepted if and only if j < L
C
2 (i).
Furthermore, LC2 (i) is monotonically decreasing in i.
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Proof. From (2.10) we can see that a class 2 arrival in state (i, j) is accepted if and
only if
v(i, j + 1)− v(i, j) ≤ r2. (2.21)
Let
LC2 (i) = min{j : v(i, j + 1)− v(i, j) > r2}.
By using property (2.16), one can show that condition (2.21) is equivalent to j <
LC2 (i).
For i1 ≤ i2, we have v(i2, j+1)−v(i2, j) ≥ v(i1, j+1)−v(i1, j), which follows from
property (2.14). By definition of LC2 (i1), we have v(i1, L
C
2 (i1)+1)−v(i1, L
C
2 (i1)) > r2,
so v(i2, L
C
2 (i1) + 1) − v(i2, L
C
2 (i1)) > r2. By definition of L
C
2 (i2), we have L
C
2 (i1) ≥
LC2 (i2). Thus, L
C
2 (i) is decreasing in i.
2.4 Social Optimization
We consider social optimization in this section. There is a single controller for the
whole system, he earns the rewards and pays the holding costs generated by all
customers. Let v(i, j) be the minimum expected total discounted cost for the system
controller with initial state (i, j). Using uniform rate Λ = λ1 + λ2 + µ, and assuming,
without loss of generality, Λ + α = 1, the optimality equations can be written as
v(i, j) = T¯ v(i, j) = C¯(i, j) + λ1T¯1v(i, j) + λ2T2v(i, j) + µT3v(i, j), (2.22)
where
C¯(i, j) = h1i + h2j,
T¯1v(i, j) = min{−r1 + v(i + 1, j), v(i, j)}, (2.23)
T2 and T3 are as defined in (2.10) and (2.11), respectively.
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Let V¯ be the set of functions such that if v ∈ V¯, then v satisfies (2.12) - (2.15),
and
• v is diagonally dominant in i, i.e.,
v(i + 1, j) + v(i + 1, j + 1) ≤ v(i, j + 1) + v(i + 2, j), (2.24)
• v is increasing in the direction of (1,−1), i.e.,
v(i, j + 1) ≤ v(i + 1, j). (2.25)
Notice that if v ∈ V¯ , then v is convex in i, i.e.,
v(i + 1, j)− v(i, j) ≤ v(i + 2, j)− v(i + 1, j). (2.26)
This follows by adding inequalities (2.14) and (2.24).
We have the following lemmas.
Lemma 5. If v ∈ V¯, then T¯1v ∈ V¯ .
Proof.
(a) For (2.12) and (2.13), the proofs are similar to part (a) of the proof of Lemma
3.
(b) Since (2.14) is symmetric with respect to i and j, the proof of T¯1 preserving
(2.14) is the same as part (c) of the proof of Lemma 3 with r2 replaced by r1
and i, j interchanged, e.g., replace term v(i + 1, j) by v(i, j + 1).
(c) For (2.15), denote by a1 (a2) the minimizing action in T¯1v(i+1, j) (T¯1v(i, j+2)).
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If a1 = a2 = 0, then
T¯1v(i, j + 1) + T¯1v(i + 1, j + 1)
≤ v(i, j + 1) + v(i + 1, j + 1)}
≤ v(i + 1, j) + v(i, j + 2) = T¯1v(i + 1, j) + T¯1v(i, j + 2),
where the second inequality follows from (2.15).
The case where a1 = a2 = 1 can be proved similarly.
If a1 = 1, a2 = 0, then
T¯1v(i, j + 1) + T¯1v(i + 1, j + 1)
≤ −r1 + v(i + 1, j + 1) + v(i + 1, j + 1)
≤ −r1 + v(i + 2, j) + v(i, j + 2) = T¯1v(i + 1, j) + T¯1v(i, j + 2),
where the second inequality follows from the sum of (2.15) and (2.24).
If a1 = 0, a2 = 1, then
T¯1v(i, j + 1) + T¯1v(i + 1, j + 1)
≤ −r1 + v(i + 1, j + 1) + v(i + 1, j + 1)
≤ v(i + 1, j)− r1 + v(i + 1, j + 2) = T¯1v(i + 1, j) + T¯1v(i, j + 2),
where the second inequality follows from (2.16).
(d) For (2.24), the proof is the same as part (d) of the proof of Lemma 3 with r2
replaced by r1 and i, j interchanged.
(e) For (2.25), denote by a the minimizing action in T¯1v(i + 1, j).
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If a = 0, then
T¯1v(i, j + 1) ≤ v(i, j + 1) ≤ v(i + 1, j) = T¯1v(i + 1, j).
If a = 1, then
T¯1v(i, j + 1) ≤ −r1 + v(i + 1, j + 1) ≤ −r1 + v(i + 2, j) = T¯1v(i + 1, j),
where the second inequality follows from (2.25) with i replaced by i + 1.
Lemma 6. If v ∈ V¯, then T2v ∈ V¯ .
Proof. T2 preserving inequalities (2.12) - (2.15) has been proved in Lemma 3. The
proof of T2 preserving (2.24) is the same as part (c) of the proof of Lemma 5 with r1
replaced by r2 and i, j interchanged.
For (2.25), denote by a the minimizing action in T2v(i + 1, j).
If a = 0, then
T2v(i, j + 1) ≤ v(i, j + 1) ≤ v(i + 1, j) = T2v(i + 1, j).
If a = 1, then
T2v(i, j + 1) ≤ −r2 + v(i, j + 2) ≤ −r2 + v(i + 1, j + 1) = T2v(i + 1, j).
Lemma 7. If v ∈ V¯, then T3v ∈ V¯ .
Proof. T3 preserving inequalities (2.12) - (2.15) has been proved in Lemma 4.
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For (2.24), if i ≥ 1, j ≥ 0, then
T3v(i + 1, j) + T3v(i + 1, j + 1) = v(i, j) + v(i, j + 1)
≤ v(i− 1, j + 1) + v(i + 1, j) = T3v(i, j + 1) + T3v(i + 2, j),
where the inequality follows from (2.24) with i replaced by i− 1.
If i = 0, j ≥ 1, then
T3v(1, j) + T3v(1, j + 1) = v(0, j) + v(0, j + 1)
≤ v(0, j) + v(1, j) = T3v(0, j + 1) + T3v(2, j),
where the inequality follows from (2.25).
If i = 0, j = 0, then
T3v(1, 0) + T3v(1, 1) = v(0, 0) + v(0, 1)
≤ v(0, 0) + v(1, 0) = T3v(0, 1) + T3v(2, 0).
For (2.25), if i ≥ 1, then
T3v(i, j + 1) = v(i− 1, j + 1) ≤ v(i, j) = T3v(i + 1, j).
If i = 0, then
T3v(0, j + 1) = v(0, j) = T3v(1, j).
The above lemmas lead to the following theorem.
Theorem 5. If h1 ≥ h2, the optimal value function v ∈ V¯.
Proof. Since h1 ≥ h2, it can be easily shown that C¯(i, j) ∈ V¯. Lemma 5, 6, 7 show
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that inequalities (2.12) - (2.15), (2.24), (2.25) are preserved under T¯1, T2, and T3.
The theorem follows from similar arguments as in the proof of Theorem 3.
Now we are ready to prove the structural properties of the socially optimal policy.
Theorem 6. Assume h1 ≥ h2, then the socially optimal policy is characterized by
two monotonically decreasing switching curves.
(1) For each i ≥ 0, there exists a threshold LS2 (i), such that a class 2 arrival in state
(i, j) is accepted if and only if j < LS2 (i). Furthermore, L
S
2 (i) is monotonically
decreasing in i.
(2) For each j ≥ 0, there exists a threshold LS1 (j), such that a class 1 arrival in state
(i, j) is accepted if and only if i < LS1 (j). Furthermore, L
S
1 (j) is monotonically
decreasing in j.
Proof. Define
LS1 (j) = min{i : v(i + 1, j)− v(i, j) > r1},
LS2 (i) = min{j : v(i, j + 1)− v(i, j) > r2}.
The theorem follows from similar arguments as in the proof of Theorem 4.
2.5 A Special Case for Social Optimization
We consider the special case where h1 = h2 under social optimization criterion in this
section.
When h1 = h2, the order of service will not affect the social welfare. So the priority
can be ignored and the problem becomes a standard admission control problem with
two classes differentiated by different arrival rates and rewards. One can apply the
proof in Stidham [42] on both classes and show that the socially optimal policy
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depends only on the total number of customers in the system and is described by two
critical numbers.
We prove this result as a special case of Theorem 6 as follows.
Lemma 8. If h1 = h2, then Lemma 5, 6, and 7 hold with (2.25) replaced by
v(i, j + 1) = v(i + 1, j). (2.27)
Proof. We only need to show that (2.27) is preserved under T¯1, T2, and T3.
For T¯1, we have
T¯1v(i, j + 1) = min{−r1 + v(i + 1, j + 1), v(i, j + 1)}
= min{−r1 + v(i + 2, j), v(i + 1, j)} = T¯1v(i + 1, j),
where the second equality follows from the fact that v(i + 1, j + 1) = v(i + 2, j) and
v(i, j + 1) = v(i + 1, j).
T2 preserving (2.27) can be proved similarly.
For T3, if i ≥ 1, then
T3v(i, j + 1) = v(i− 1, j + 1) = v(i, j) = T3v(i + 1, j).
If i = 0, then
T3v(0, j + 1) = v(0, j) = T3v(1, j).
Since C¯(i, j) obviously satisfies (2.27), Lemma 8 implies that Theorem 5 and 6
still hold after replacing (2.25) with (2.27). Thus, we have
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Theorem 7. If h1 = h2, then there exist constants l1, l2 such that
LS1 (j) = l1 − j, (2.28)
LS2 (i) = l2 − i, (2.29)
where l1 ≥ l2 if and only if r1 ≥ r2.
Proof. Let l1 = L
S
1 (0). In order to prove (2.28), we only need to show that L
S
1 (j+1) =
LS1 (j)− 1 for any j ≥ 0.
Let i′ = i + 1, we have
LS1 (j + 1) = min{i : v(i + 1, j + 1)− v(i, j + 1) > r1}
= min{i : v(i + 2, j)− v(i + 1, j) > r1}
= min{i′ − 1 : v(i′ + 1, j)− v(i′, j) > r1}
= min{i′ : v(i′ + 1, j)− v(i′, j)} − 1
= LS1 (j)− 1,
where the second equality follows from Lemma 8.
(2.29) can be proved similarly by setting l2 = L
S
2 (0).
We have
l1 = L
S
1 (0) = min{i : v(i + 1, 0)− v(i, 0) > r1},
and
l2 = L
S
2 (0) = min{j : v(0, j + 1)− v(0, j) > r2}
= min{j : v(j + 1, 0)− v(j, 0) > r2},
where the second equality follows from Lemma 8. Therefore, l1 ≥ l2 if and only if
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r1 ≥ r2.
2.6 Comparison and Numerical Results
We compare the optimal policies under different criteria in this section. First, consider
the optimal policies for class 1 customers. Under individual optimization criterion,
the cost incurred by a class 1 customer is just his own waiting cost (the internal
effect). Under class optimization criterion, besides the internal effect, each class 1
customer also causes delay on the class 1 customers joining the system later (the
external effect). Under social optimization criterion, the internal effect is the same
and the external effect is imposed on all class 2 customers as well as later class 1
customers. Thus, intuitively, accepting a class 1 customer is the most expensive under
social optimization and the least expensive under individual optimization. Hence,
the number of class 1 customers admitted to the system is the most under individual
optimization and the least under social optimization. This intuition is shown to be
correct by the following theorem.
Theorem 8. LS1 (j) ≤ L
C
1 ≤ L
I
1, ∀j ≥ 0, where the first inequality holds when h1 ≥ h2.
Proof. For a GI/M/1 single-class queue with convex, nondecreasing holding cost rate,
Stidham (1978) proves that more customers are accepted by the individually optimal
policy than by the socially optimal policy. As a special case of Stidham’s result, we
have the second inequality, i.e., LC1 ≤ L
I
1. Note that the socially optimal policy in
Stidham’s model corresponds to the class-optimal policy here.
We prove the first inequality, i.e., LS1 (j) ≤ L
C
1 , ∀j ≥ 0, in the following. Since
LS1 (j) is decreasing in j, we just need to prove L
S
1 (0) ≤ L
C
1 . Denote the socially
optimal expected total discounted cost by vs(i, j). When j = 0, the optimality
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equations can be written as
vs(i, 0) = h1i + λ1 min{−r1 + v
s(i + 1, 0), vs(i, 0)}
+ λ2 min{−r2 + v
s(i, 1), vs(i, 0)}+ µvs((i− 1)+, 0).
Then
LS1 (0) = min{i : v
s(i + 1, 0)− vs(i, 0) > r1}. (2.30)
Denote the class-optimal expected total discounted cost for controller 1 by vc(i), the
optimality equations can be written as
vc(i) = h1i + λ1 min{−r1 + v
c(i + 1), vc(i)} + µvc((i− 1)+).
Then
LC1 = min{i : v
c(i + 1)− vc(i) > r1}. (2.31)
If we can prove
vc(i + 1)− vc(i) ≤ vs(i + 1, 0)− vs(i, 0), (2.32)
then the theorem follows.
Apply value iteration. Let vc0(i) = v
s
0(i, 0) = 0, ∀i, then (2.32) is satisfied at
iteration 0. Suppose (2.32) is true at iteration n, i.e., vcn(i + 1) − v
c
n(i) ≤ v
s
n(i +
1, 0)− vsn(i, 0). If we can show it is also true at iteration n + 1 then (2.32) follows by
induction and the convergence of value iteration.
vcn+1(i + 1)− v
c
n+1(i)
= h1 + λ1(min{−r1 + v
c
n(i + 2), v
c
n(i + 1)} −min{−r1 + v
c
n(i + 1), v
c
n(i)})
+ µ(vcn(i)− v
c
n((i− 1)
+)), (2.33)
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and
vsn+1(i + 1, 0)− v
s
n+1(i, 0)
= h1 + λ1(min{−r1 + v
s
n(i + 2, 0), v
s
n(i + 1, 0)} −min{−r1 + v
s
n(i + 1, 0), v
s
n(i, 0)})
+ λ2(min{−r2 + v
s
n(i + 1, 1), v
s
n(i + 1, 0)} −min{−r2 + v
s
n(i, 1), v
s
n(i, 0)})
+ µ(vsn(i, 0)− v
s
n((i− 1)
+, 0)). (2.34)
To simplify notation, let
Ds1 = min{−r1 + v
s
n(i + 2, 0), v
s
n(i + 1, 0)} −min{−r1 + v
s
n(i + 1, 0), v
s
n(i, 0)},
Ds2 = min{−r2 + v
s
n(i + 1, 1), v
s
n(i + 1, 0)} −min{−r2 + v
s
n(i, 1), v
s
n(i, 0)},
Ds3 = v
s
n(i, 0)− v
s
n((i− 1)
+, 0),
Dc1 = min{−r1 + v
c
n(i + 2), v
c
n(i + 1)} −min{−r1 + v
c
n(i + 1), v
c
n(i)},
Dc3 = v
c
n(i)− v
c
n((i− 1)
+).
Compare Ds1 and D
c
1 first.
Obviously vc0 is nondecreasing and convex in i. Following similar approach as in
part (c) of the proof of Lemma 3, one can show that if vcn is nondecreasing and convex
in i, so is vcn+1. Therefore, if v
c
n(i + 1) − v
c
n(i) > r1, then v
c
n(i + 2)− v
c
n(i + 1) > r1.
By induction hypothesis, we also have vsn(i + 1, 0)− v
s
n(i, 0) > r1. So
Dc1 = v
c
n(i + 1)− v
c
n(i) ≤ v
s
n(i + 1, 0) + v
s
n(i, 0) = D
s
1.
If vcn(i+1)−v
c
n(i) ≤ r1 and v
c
n(i+2)−v
c
n(i+1) > r1, then v
s
n(i+2, 0)−v
s
n(i+1, 0) >
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r1. So
Dc1 = v
c
n(i + 1)− (−r1 + v
c
n(i + 1)) = r1
≤ vsn(i + 1, 0)−min{−r1 + v
s
n(i + 1, 0), v
s
n(i, 0)} = D
s
1.
If vcn(i + 1)− v
c
n(i) ≤ r1, v
c
n(i + 2)− v
c
n(i + 1) ≤ r1, and v
s
n(i + 1, 0)− v
s
n(i, 0) > r1,
then vsn(i + 2, 0)− v
s
n(i + 1, 0) > r1, which follows from (2.26). Thus
Dc1 = v
c
n(i + 2)− v
c
n(i + 1)) ≤ r1 < v
s
n(i + 1, 0)− v
s
n(i, 0) = D
s
1.
If vcn(i + 1)− v
c
n(i) ≤ r1, v
c
n(i + 2)− v
c
n(i + 1) ≤ r1, v
s
n(i + 1, 0)− v
s
n(i, 0) ≤ r1, and
vsn(i + 2, 0)− v
s
n(i + 1, 0) > r1, then
Dc1 = v
c
n(i + 2)− v
c
n(i + 1)) ≤ r1 = v
s
n(i + 1, 0)− (−r1 + v
s
n(i + 1, 0)) = D
s
1.
If vcn(i + 1)− v
c
n(i) ≤ r1, v
c
n(i + 2)− v
c
n(i + 1) ≤ r1, v
s
n(i + 1, 0)− v
s
n(i, 0) ≤ r1, and
vsn(i + 2, 0)− v
s
n(i + 1, 0) ≤ r1, then
Dc1 = v
c
n(i + 2)− v
c
n(i + 1)) ≤ v
s
n(i + 2, 0)− v
s
n(i + 1, 0)
= −r1 + v
s
n(i + 2, 0)− (−r1 + v
s
n(i + 1, 0)) = D
s
1.
Therefore, Dc1 ≤ D
s
1.
Now consider Ds2.
If vsn(i + 1, 1)− v
s
n(i + 1, 0) ≤ r2, then v
s
n(i, 1)− v
s
n(i, 0) ≤ r2. So
Ds2 = −r2 + v
s
n(i + 1, 1)− (−r2 + v
s
n(i, 1)) = v
s
n(i + 1, 1)− v
s
n(i, 1) ≥ 0.
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If vsn(i + 1, 1)− v
s
n(i + 1, 0) > r2 and v
s
n(i, 1)− v
s
n(i, 0) ≤ r2, then
Ds2 = v
s
n(i + 1, 0)− (−r2 + v
s
n(i, 1)) ≥ r2 > 0,
which follows from (2.25).
If vsn(i + 1, 1)− v
s
n(i + 1, 0) > r2 and v
s
n(i, 1)− v
s
n(i, 0) > r2, then
Ds2 = v
s
n(i + 1, 0)− v
s
n(i, 0)) ≥ 0.
Therefore, Ds2 ≥ 0.
By induction hypothesis, Dc3 ≤ D
s
3.
Combining the above results, we have
vcn+1(i + 1)− v
c
n+1(i) ≤ v
s
n+1(i + 1, 0)− v
s
n+1(i, 0),
thus the theorem follows.
Now consider the optimal policies for class 2 customers. The external effects of
a class 2 customer are the same under class optimization and social optimization.
Since the class-optimal policy accepts more class 1 customers than the socially opti-
mal policy, which causes more delay on class 2 customers, the internal effect of a class
2 customer is higher under class optimization than under social optimization. There-
fore, intuitively, the class-optimal policy accepts fewer class 2 customers than the
socially optimal policy. This intuition is proved to be true by the following theorem.
Theorem 9. Assume h1 ≥ h2, then L
C
2 (i) ≤ L
S
2 (i), ∀i ≥ 0.
Proof. We follow similar approach as in the proof of Theorem 8. Denote the socially
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optimal expected total discounted cost by vs(i, j). The optimality equations are
vs(i, j) = h1i + h2j + λ1 min{−r1 + v
s(i + 1, j), vs(i, j)}
+ λ2 min{−r2 + v
s(i, j + 1), vs(i, j)}+ µ


vs(i− 1, j), if i ≥ 1
vs(0, j − 1), if i = 0, j ≥ 1
vs(0, 0), if i = j = 0.
Then
LS2 (i) = min{j : v
s(i, j + 1)− vs(i, j) > r2}. (2.35)
Denote the class-optimal expected total discounted cost for controller 2 by vc(i, j),
the optimality equations are
vc(i, j) = h2j + λ1


vc(i + 1, j), if i < LC1
vc(i, j), if i ≥ LC1
+ λ2 min{−r2 + v
c(i, j + 1), vc(i, j)}+ µ


vc(i− 1, j), if i ≥ 1
vc(0, j − 1), if i = 0, j ≥ 1
vc(0, 0), if i = j = 0.
Then
LC2 (i) = min{j : v
c(i, j + 1)− vc(i, j) > r2}. (2.36)
If we can show
vs(i, j + 1)− vs(i, j) ≤ vc(i, j + 1)− vc(i, j), ∀i, (2.37)
then the theorem follows.
Apply value iteration. Let vc0(i, j) = v
s
0(i, j) = v
s(i, j), ∀i, j, then (2.37) is satisfied
at iteration 0. Suppose (2.37) is true at iteration n, i.e., vsn(i, j + 1) − v
s
n(i, j) ≤
vcn(i, j + 1) − v
c
n(i, j). If we can prove it is also true at iteration n + 1 then (2.37)
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follows by induction and the convergence of value iteration.
We have
vcn+1(i, j + 1)− v
c
n+1(i, j)
= h2 + λ1


vcn(i + 1, j + 1)− v
c
n(i + 1, j), if i < L
C
1
vcn(i, j + 1)− v
c
n(i, j), if i ≥ L
C
1
+ λ2(min{−r2 + v
c
n(i, j + 2), v
c
n(i, j + 1)} −min{−r2 + v
c
n(i, j + 1), v
c
n(i, j)})
+ µ


vcn(i− 1, j + 1)− v
c
n(i− 1, j), if i ≥ 1
vcn(0, j)− v
c
n(0, j − 1), if i = 0, j ≥ 1
0, if i = j = 0.
and
vsn+1(i, j + 1)− v
s
n+1(i, j)
= h2 + λ1(min{−r1 + v
s
n(i + 1, j + 1), v
s
n(i, j + 1)} −min{−r1 + v
s
n(i + 1, j), v
s
n(i, j)})
+ λ2(min{−r2 + v
s
n(i, j + 2), v
s
n(i, j + 1)} −min{−r2 + v
s
n(i, j + 1), v
s
n(i, j)})
+ µ


vsn(i− 1, j + 1)− v
s
n(i− 1, j), if i ≥ 1
vsn(0, j)− v
s
n(0, j − 1), if i = 0, j ≥ 1
0, if i = j = 0.
To simplify notation, let
Ds1 = min{−r1 + v
s
n(i + 1, j + 1), v
s
n(i, j + 1)} −min{−r1 + v
s
n(i + 1, j), v
s
n(i, j)},
Ds2 = min{−r2 + v
s
n(i, j + 2), v
s
n(i, j + 1)} −min{−r2 + v
s
n(i, j + 1), v
s
n(i, j)},
Ds3 =


vsn(i− 1, j + 1)− v
s
n(i− 1, j), if i ≥ 1
vsn(0, j)− v
s
n(0, j − 1), if i = 0, j ≥ 1
0, if i = j = 0,
38
Dc1 =


vcn(i + 1, j + 1)− v
c
n(i + 1, j), if i < L
C
1
vcn(i, j + 1)− v
c
n(i, j), if i ≥ L
C
1 ,
Dc2 = min{−r2 + v
c
n(i, j + 2), v
c
n(i, j + 1)} −min{−r2 + v
c
n(i, j + 1), v
c
n(i, j)},
Dc3 =


vcn(i− 1, j + 1)− v
c
n(i− 1, j), if i ≥ 1
vcn(0, j)− v
c
n(0, j − 1), if i = 0, j ≥ 1
0, if i = j = 0.
Compare Ds1 and D
c
1 first.
If vsn(i + 1, j)− v
s
n(i, j) > r1, then v
s
n(i + 1, j + 1)− v
s
n(i, j + 1) > r1, which follows
from (2.14). So
Ds1 = v
s
n(i, j + 1)− v
s
n(i, j) ≤ v
c
n(i, j + 1)− v
c
n(i, j) ≤ D
c
1.
Since LS1 (j) ≤ L
C
1 , ∀j, class 1 arrivals in state (i, j) with i ≥ L
C
1 are always
rejected by the socially optimal policy, i.e., vs(i +1, j)− vs(i, j) > r1, ∀i ≥ L
C
1 . Since
vs0(i, j) = v
s(i, j), we have vsk(i, j) = v
s(i, j), ∀k ≥ 0. Hence, vsk(i+1, j)−v
s
k(i, j) > r1,
∀k ≥ 0, i ≥ LC1 .
If vsn(i + 1, j) − v
s
n(i, j) ≤ r1 and v
s
n(i + 1, j + 1) − v
s
n(i, j + 1) > r1, the above
observation yields i < LC1 . So
Ds1 = v
s
n(i, j + 1)− (−r1 + v
s
n(i + 1, j))
≤ vsn(i, j + 1) + (v
s
n(i + 1, j + 1)− v
s
n(i, j + 1))− v
s
n(i + 1, j)
= vsn(i + 1, j + 1)− v
s
n(i + 1, j) ≤ v
c
n(i + 1, j + 1)− v
c
n(i + 1, j) = D
c
1.
If vsn(i + 1, j)− v
s
n(i, j) ≤ r1, v
s
n(i + 1, j + 1)− v
s
n(i, j + 1) ≤ r1, then i < L
C
1 . So
Ds1 = −r1 + v
s
n(i + 1, j + 1)− (−r1 + v
s
n(i + 1, j))
= vsn(i + 1, j + 1)− v
s
n(i + 1, j) ≤ v
c
n(i + 1, j + 1)− v
c
n(i + 1, j) = D
c
1.
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Therefore, Ds1 ≤ D
c
1.
Now consider Ds2 and D
c
2.
If vsn(i, j + 1) − v
s
n(i, j) > r2, then v
s
n(i, j + 2) − v
s
n(i, j + 1) > r2, which follows
from (2.16). By induction hypothesis, we have vcn(i, j +1)−v
c
n(i, j) > r2 and v
c
n(i, j +
2)− vcn(i, j + 1) > r2. So
Ds2 = v
s
n(i, j + 1)− v
s
n(i, j) ≤ v
c
n(i, j + 1)− v
c
n(i, j) = D
c
2.
If vsn(i, j +1)− v
s
n(i, j) ≤ r2 and v
s
n(i, j +2)− v
s
n(i, j +1) > r2. Then v
c
n(i, j +2)−
vcn(i, j + 1) > r2. So
Ds2 = v
s
n(i, j + 1)− (−r2 + v
s
n(i, j + 1)) = r2
≤ vcn(i, j + 1)−min{−r2 + v
c
n(i, j + 1), v
c
n(i, j)} = D
c
2.
If vsn(i, j+1)−v
s
n(i, j) ≤ r2, v
s
n(i, j+2)−v
s
n(i, j+1) ≤ r2, v
c
n(i, j+1)−v
c
n(i, j) > r2,
then vcn(i, j + 2)− v
c
n(i, j + 1) > r2, which follows from (2.16). So
Ds2 = v
s
n(i, j + 2)− v
s
n(i, j + 1)) ≤ r2
< vcn(i, j + 1)− v
c
n(i, j) = D
c
2.
If vsn(i, j+1)−v
s
n(i, j) ≤ r2, v
s
n(i, j+2)−v
s
n(i, j+1) ≤ r2, v
c
n(i, j+1)−v
c
n(i, j) ≤ r2,
and vcn(i, j + 2)− v
c
n(i, j + 1) > r2, then
Ds2 = v
s
n(i, j + 2)− v
s
n(i, j + 1)) ≤ r2
= vcn(i, j + 1)− (−r2 + v
c
n(i, j + 1)) = D
c
2.
If vsn(i, j+1)−v
s
n(i, j) ≤ r2, v
s
n(i, j+2)−v
s
n(i, j+1) ≤ r2, v
c
n(i, j+1)−v
c
n(i, j) ≤ r2,
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and vcn(i, j + 2)− v
c
n(i, j + 1) ≤ r2, then
Ds2 = −r2+v
s
n(i, j+2)−(−r2+v
s
n(i, j+1)) ≤ −r2+v
c
n(i, j+2)−(−r2+v
c
n(i, j+1)) = D
c
2.
Therefore, Ds2 ≤ D
c
2.
By induction hypothesis, Ds3 ≤ D
c
3.
Combining the above results, we have
vsn+1(i, j + 1)− v
s
n+1(i, j) ≤ v
c
n+1(i, j + 1)− v
c
n+1(i, j),
thus the theorem follows.
It is worth noting that the comparisons between class-optimal and socially optimal
policies give opposite results for class 1 and class 2. This contrast has the following
interesting socioeconomic connotation. Suppose the whole society can be divided
into two classes, influentials and grass roots. If we define “better” as “more people
get served”, then the influentials will prefer to optimize things within their own class,
while the grass roots will be better off if the society is centrally controlled by a decision
maker who can take their benefits into consideration. Seen in this fashion, the result
makes intuitive sense.
Now compare the individually optimal policy with the other two optimal policies.
Under individual optimization, a class 2 customer has no external effect, but it has
more internal effect than under class or social optimization, since the individually
optimal policy accepts the most class 1 customers. So the comparison results between
LI2(i) and L
C
2 (i) and between L
I
2(i) and L
C
2 (i) depend on which effect is dominant.
We demonstrate the above results by numerical examples below. The numerical
examples are computed by using standard value iteration algorithm. We approximate
the infinite state space by assuming that no customers arrive when the total number
of customers in the system reaches an upper bound B, which is much larger than the
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expected queue length. Thus the state space is S = {(i, j) : 0 ≤ i, j ≤ B}. The
stopping criterion is max{|vn+1(i, j) − vn(i, j)| : (i, j) ∈ S} ≤ 10
−5, where vn(i, j) is
the value function at the nth iteration.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the optimal policies for class 1 customers with parameters
α = 0.05, µ = 0.5, λ1 = 0.44, λ2 = 0.01, h1 = 20, h2 = 10, r1 = 200, r2 = 190. Figure
2.2 - 2.6 illustrate the optimal policies for class 2 customers under different arrival
rates. Figure 2.2 uses the same parameters as used in Figure 2.1 and shows that
LI2(i) ≤ L
C
2 (i) ≤ L
S
2 (i), ∀i. Keeping the other parameters the same, Figure 2.3 uses
λ1 = 0.39, λ2 = 0.06, and shows that L
C
2 (i) ≤ L
I
2(i) ≤ L
S
2 (i), ∀i. Figure 2.4 uses
λ1 = 0.27, λ2 = 0.18, and shows that L
C
2 (i) ≤ L
S
2 (i) ≤ L
I
2(i), ∀i. Figure 2.5 uses
λ1 = 0.41, λ2 = 0.04, and shows that L
I
2(i) ≥ L
C
2 (i) for i ≤ 4, L
I
2(i) ≤ L
C
2 (i) for i ≥ 5.
Figure 2.6 uses λ1 = 0.32, λ2 = 0.13, and shows that L
I
2(i) ≤ L
S
2 (i) for i ≤ 7, L
I
2(i) ≥
LS2 (i) for i ≥ 8. We only change the arrival rates in the above examples. However,
other numerical examples show that changing other parameters may also affect the
relative position of LI2(i). Thus the relationship between the individually optimal
policy and either of the other two optimal policies can be arbitrary depending on the
parameters.
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Chapter 3
Admission Control: Sample Path
Approach
3.1 Problem Description
In this chapter, we study the multi-priority admission control problem as defined in
Chapter 2 with the following two differences: (i) Rewards are generated at the time
of service completion instead of the time of joining the repair queue. This shift of
reward time changes the nature of the problem in some critical ways, e.g. the optimal
value function is no longer non-decreasing in the number of customers of each type in
initial state, and the cases where every customer is accepted do not exist anymore. (ii)
We prove the structural results using sample path analysis (specifically, the coupling
method) (Lindvall [26], Wu et al. [47] ) instead of standard value iteration method
as used in Chapter 2. The sample path approach provides more concise proofs.
We analyze the optimal control policy under the 3 criteria proposed in Chapter
2, i.e., individual optimization, class optimization, and social optimization. We also
compare different policies numerically.
3.2 Individual Optimization
Following the same approach as the proof of Theorem 1, we can derive the following
results for individually optimal policies.
Theorem 10. Under the individual optimization criterion, an arriving class 1 cus-
tomer who sees the system in state (i, j) joins the queue if and only if i < LI1, where
LI1 = blog
h1
h1 + αr1
/ log
µ
µ + α
c. (3.1)
An arriving class 2 customer who sees the system in state (i, j) joins the queue if and
only if j < LI2(i), where
LI2(i) =


blog h2
(h2+αr2)φi(α)
/ log βc, if i ≤ LI1
b(log h2
(h2+αr2)φLI
1
(α)
+ (i− LI1)(log
µ+α
µ
))/ log βc, if i > LI1
(3.2)
where φi(α) is the LST of the busy period initiated by i class 1 customers and β =
µ
α+µ+λ1(1−φ1(α))
. bxc is the largest integer less than or equal to x. Furthermore, LI2(i)
is decreasing in i.
Note that shifting the reward time (from the moment a customer joins the queue
to the moment a customer finishes service) not only changes the form of the threshold
functions but also eliminates the cases where everyone is accepted.
3.3 Social Optimization
We consider socially optimal policies in this section. The objective of a socially
optimal policy is to minimize the expected total discounted net cost generated by
all customers. Let v(i, j) be the expected total discounted net cost generated by a
socially optimal policy over an infinite horizon starting from state (i, j). Following
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Lippman [27], we uniformize the process by defining the uniform rate Λ = λ1 +λ2 +µ.
Rescaling time so that Λ + α = 1, we have the following optimality equations
v(i, j) = h1i + h2j + λ1 min{v(i, j), v(i + 1, j)}
+λ2 min{v(i, j), v(i, j + 1)}
+µ


v(i− 1, j)− r1, if i ≥ 1
v(0, j − 1)− r2, if i = 0, j ≥ 1
v(0, 0), if i = 0, j = 0.
(3.3)
Lemma 9. v(0, 1)− v(0, 0) + r2 ≥ 0.
Proof. Define two processes on the same probability space so that they see the same
arrivals and potential services. Process 1 starts in state (0, 1) and follows optimal
policy. Process 2 starts in state (0, 0) and follows policy φ which is described below.
Let τ be the first time Process 1 reaches state (0, 0). Let Process 2 take the same
action as Process 1 upon each arrival until time τ , then follow the optimal policy
afterwards. If a new class 2 customer is accepted while Process 1 is serving the last
class 2 customer, we resample the remaining service time of the class 2 customer
currently under service in Process 1 so that he finishes service at the same time as
the new class 2 customer in Process 2. (This resampling argument can be applied to
similar situations in the rest of this paper.) Therefore, Process 1 and 2 have identical
customers except for one extra class 2 customer in Process 1 until time τ . Two
processes become identical from then on. Thus,
v(0, 1)− v(0, 0) ≥ v(0, 1)− vφ(0, 0)
= E
∫ τ
0
e−αth2dt + Ee
−ατ (−r2 + v(0, 0)− v(0, 0))
≥ −r2Ee
−ατ ≥ −r2.
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Lemma 10. v is supermodular, i.e.,
v(i + 1, j + 1)− v(i + 1, j)− v(i, j + 1) + v(i, j) ≥ 0. (3.4)
Proof. Fix i and j. Define four processes on the same probability space so that they
see the same arrivals and potential services. Process 1 and 4 follow optimal policies
and start in states (i+1, j +1) and (i, j), respectively. Process 2 and 3 start in states
(i + 1, j) and (i, j + 1), respectively, and use policies φ2 and φ3 which are described
below. Denote the state of Process k at time t by (Xkt , Y
k
t ), k = 1, 2, 3, 4.
Let τ1 be the first time Process 2 and 3 have 0 customers entirely. Note that if
Process 2 and 3 take the same action upon each arrival they will reach state (0,0) at
the same time, since service rates are the same for both classes. Let τ2 be the first
time Process 1 and 4 take different actions. Define τ = min{τ1, τ2}. Let Process 2
and 3 take the same action as Process 1 and 4 until time τ , then follow the optimal
policy afterwards. Thus
v(i + 1, j + 1)− v(i + 1, j)− v(i, j + 1) + v(i, j)
≥ v(i + 1, j + 1)− vφ2(i + 1, j)− vφ3(i, j + 1) + v(i, j)
= E
∫ τ
0
e−αt[h(X4t + 1, Y
4
t + 1)− h(X
4
t + 1, Y
4
t )− h(X
4
t , Y
4
t + 1) + h(X
4
t , Y
4
t )]dt
+Ee−ατ (−R1 + R2 + R3 −R4)
+Ee−ατ (v(X1τ , Y
1
τ )− v(X
2
τ , Y
2
τ )− v(X
3
τ , Y
3
τ ) + v(X
4
τ , Y
4
τ )),
where Ri is the potential reward generated in Process i at time τ . It can be easily
seen that the first term is 0 because of the linear holding cost rate.
To simplify notation, define
D = v(i + 1, j + 1)− v(i + 1, j)− v(i, j + 1) + v(i, j) (3.5)
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A = −R1 + R2 + R3 − R4 (3.6)
B = v(X1τ , Y
1
τ )− v(X
2
τ , Y
2
τ )− v(X
3
τ , Y
3
τ ) + v(X
4
τ , Y
4
τ ). (3.7)
Case 1: τ = τ1. Then, at τ , the four processes are in states (0, 1), (0, 0), (0, 0), and
(0, 0), respectively. The two distinct paths by which this state is reached are: (i)
{(1, 2) (1, 1) (0, 2) (0, 1)} → {(0, 2) (0, 1) (0, 1) (0, 0)} → {(0, 1) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0)};
(ii) {(2, 1) (2, 0) (1, 1) (1, 0)} → {(1, 1) (1, 0) (0, 1) (0, 0)} → {(0, 1) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0)}.
In the former case, R1 = R2 = R3 = r2, and R4 = 0. In the latter case, R1 = R2 = r1,
R3 = r2, and R4 = 0. In both cases, we have
D ≥ Ee−ατ (r2 + v(0, 1)− v(0, 0)) ≥ 0,
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 9.
Case 2: τ = τ2. Then A = 0. We have the following possibilities.
Case 2.1: A class 1 arrival is accepted by Process 1 and rejected by Process 4. Let
Process 2 accept the arrival and Process 3 reject it. Then after this event the states
in four processes are (X4τ + 2, Y
4
τ + 1), (X
4
τ + 2, Y
4
τ ), (X
4
τ , Y
4
τ + 1), and (X
4
τ , Y
4
τ ),
respectively. Adding and subtracting v(X4τ + 1, Y
4
τ + 1) + v(X
4
τ + 1, Y
4
τ ), we have
B = v(X4τ + 2, Y
4
τ + 1)− v(X
4
τ + 1, Y
4
τ + 1)− v(X
4
τ + 2, Y
4
τ ) + v(X
4
τ + 1, Y
4
τ )
+v(X4τ + 1, Y
4
τ + 1)− v(X
4
τ , Y
4
τ + 1)− v(X
4
τ + 1, Y
4
τ ) + v(X
4
τ , Y
4
τ ).
Note that the first four terms and the second four terms above are inequality (3.4)
evaluated at (X4τ + 1, Y
4
τ ) and (X
4
τ , Y
4
τ ), respectively. Thus the above argument can
be repeated until either Case 1 or Case 2.2 or Case 2.4 happens.
Case 2.2: A class 1 arrival is rejected by Process 1 and accepted by Process 4. Let
Process 2 reject the arrival and Process 3 accept it. Then after this event the states
in four processes are (X4τ +1, Y
4
τ +1), (X
4
τ +1, Y
4
τ ), (X
4
τ +1, Y
4
τ +1), and (X
4
τ +1, Y
4
τ ),
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respectively. Note that Process 1 and 3 couple, so do Process 2 and 4. Therefore
B = 0 and (3.4) holds.
Case 2.3: A class 2 arrival is accepted by Process 1 and rejected by Process 4. Let
Process 2 reject the arrival and Process 3 accept it. Then after this event the states
in four processes are (X4τ + 1, Y
4
τ + 2), (X
4
τ + 1, Y
4
τ ), (X
4
τ , Y
4
τ + 2), and (X
4
τ , Y
4
τ ),
respectively. Adding and subtracting v(X4τ + 1, Y
4
τ + 1) + v(X
4
τ , Y
4
τ + 1), we have
B = v(X4τ + 1, Y
4
τ + 2)− v(X
4
τ + 1, Y
4
τ + 1)− v(X
4
τ , Y
4
τ + 2) + v(X
4
τ , Y
4
τ + 1)
+v(X4τ + 1, Y
4
τ + 1)− v(X
4
τ + 1, Y
4
τ )− v(X
4
τ , Y
4
τ + 1) + v(X
4
τ , Y
4
τ ).
Note that the first four terms and the second four terms are inequality (3.4) evaluated
at (X4τ , Y
4
τ +1) and (X
4
τ , Y
4
τ ), respectively. Thus the above argument can be repeated
until either Case 1 or Case 2.2 or Case 2.4 happens.
Case 2.4: A class 2 arrival is rejected by Process 1 and accepted by Process 4. Let
Process 2 accept the arrival and Process 3 reject it. Then after this event the states
in four processes are (X4τ +1, Y
4
τ +1), (X
4
τ +1, Y
4
τ +1), (X
4
τ , Y
4
τ +1), and (X
4
τ , Y
4
τ +1),
respectively. Note that Process 1 and 2 couple, so do Process 3 and 4. Therefore
B = 0 and (3.4) holds.
Lemma 11. v(i, j) is a unimodal function in i, i.e., if v(i + 1, j)− v(i, j) ≥ 0, then
v(i + 2, j)− v(i + 1, j) ≥ 0.
Proof. Define two processes on the same probability space so that they see the same
arrivals and potential services. Process 1 follows the optimal policy and starts in state
(i + 2, j). Process 2 starts in state (i + 1, j) and follows policy φ that is described
below.
Let τ be the first time Process 1 has i + 1 class 1 customers. Process 2 takes
the same action as Process 1 upon arrivals until τ then follow the optimal policy
afterwards. Thus, at time τ Process 2 has i class 1 customers and the same number
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of class 2 customers, say j ′, as in Process 1. We have j ′ ≥ j, since no class 2 customers
have started service yet. Hence
v(i + 2, j)− v(i + 1, j) ≥ v(i + 2, j)− vφ(i + 1, j)
= E
∫ τ
0
e−αth1dt + Ee
−ατ (v(i + 1, j ′)− v(i, j ′)),
where j ′ ≥ j. From supermodularity, we have
v(i + 1, j ′)− v(i, j ′) ≥ v(i + 1, j)− v(i, j) ≥ 0.
Therefore v(i + 2, j)− v(i + 1, j) ≥ 0.
Theorem 11. The socially optimal policy for admitting class 1 customers is char-
acterized by a monotonically decreasing switching curve, i.e., for each j ≥ 0, there
exists a threshold Ls1(j), such that a class 1 arrival in state (i, j) is accepted if and
only if i < Ls1(j). Furthermore, L
s
1(j) is monotonically decreasing in j.
Proof. We follow the convention that a customer is accepted when accepting or re-
jecting that customer makes no difference in terms of cost. Then a class 1 arrival in
state (i, j) is accepted if and only if v(i + 1, j) ≤ v(i, j). For any fixed j, let
Ls1(j) = min{i : v(i + 1, j) > v(i, j)}.
Using Lemma 11, one can easily show that a class 1 arrival is accepted if and only if
i < Ls1(j).
For j1 ≤ j2, we have v(i+1, j2)−v(i, j2) ≥ v(i+1, j1)−v(i, j1), which follows from
supermodularity. By definition of Ls1(j1), we have v(L
s
1(j1) + 1, j1) > v(L1(j1), j1),
so v(Ls1(j1) + 1, j2) > v(L
s
1(j1), j2). By definition of L
s
1(j2), we have L
s
1(j1) ≥ L
s
1(j2).
Thus, Ls1(j) is decreasing in j.
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Lemma 12. If h1 ≥ h2 and r1 ≥ r2, then v is diagonally dominant in both i and j,
i.e.,
v(i, j + 2)− v(i, j + 1)− v(i + 1, j + 1) + v(i + 1, j) ≥ 0, (3.8)
v(i, j + 1)− v(i + 1, j)− v(i + 1, j + 1) + v(i + 2, j) ≥ 0. (3.9)
Proof. (a). Consider (3.8) first.
Define four processes on the same probability space so that they see the same
arrivals and potential services. Process 1 and 4 follow optimal policies and start in
state (i, j + 2) and (i + 1, j), respectively. Process 2 and 3 start in state (i, j + 1)
and (i + 1, j + 1), respectively, and use policies φ2 and φ3 which are described below.
Denote the state of Process k at time t by (Xkt , Y
k
t ), k = 1, 2, 3, 4.
Let τ1 be the first time Process 3 and 4 have 0 class 1 customers. Since service
rates are the same for both classes, Process 1 and 2 finish serving the first class 2
customer at τ1. Let τ2 be the first time Process 1 and 4 take different actions. Define
τ = min{τ1, τ2}. Let Process 2 and 3 take the same action as Process 1 and 4 upon
each arrival until time τ , then follow the optimal policy afterwards. Thus
v(i, j + 2)− v(i, j + 1)− v(i + 1, j + 1) + v(i + 1, j)
≥ v(i, j + 2)− vφ2(i, j + 1)− vφ3(i + 1, j + 1) + v(i + 1, j)
= E
∫ τ
0
e−αt[h(X4t − 1, Y
4
t + 2)− h(X
4
t − 1, Y
4
t + 1)− h(X
4
t , Y
4
t + 1) + h(X
4
t , Y
4
t )]dt
+Ee−ατ (−R1 + R2 + R3 − R4)
+Ee−ατ (v(X1τ , Y
1
τ )− v(X
2
τ , Y
2
τ )− v(X
3
τ , Y
3
τ ) + v(X
4
τ , Y
4
τ )),
where Ri is the potential reward generated in Process i at time τ . It can be easily
seen that the first term is 0 because of the linear holding cost rate.
Define A, B as in (3.6), (3.7).
Case a.1: τ = τ1. Then the states in four processes at time τ are (0, Y
4
τ + 1), (0, Y
4
τ ),
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(0, Y 4τ +1), and (0, Y
4
τ ), respectively. Note that Process 1 and 3 couple, so do Process
2 and 4. Therefore B = 0. Also, R1 = R2 = r2 and R3 = R4 = r1, so A = 0. Thus
(3.8) holds.
Case a.2: τ = τ2. Then A = 0. We have the following possibilities.
Case a.2.1: A class 1 arrival is accepted by Process 1 and rejected by Process 4. Let
Process 2 accept the arrival and Process 3 reject it. Then the states in four processes
at time τ are (X4τ , Y
4
τ + 2), (X
4
τ , Y
4
τ + 1), (X
4
τ , Y
4
τ + 1), and (X
4
τ , Y
4
τ ), respectively.
Adding and subtracting v(X4τ + 1, Y
4
τ + 1) + v(X
4
τ + 1, Y
4
τ ), we have
B = v(X4τ , Y
4
τ + 2)− v(X
4
τ + 1, Y
4
τ + 1)− v(X
4
τ , Y
4
τ + 1) + v(X
4
τ + 1, Y
4
τ )
+v(X4τ + 1, Y
4
τ + 1)− v(X
4
τ , Y
4
τ + 1)− v(X
4
τ + 1, Y
4
τ ) + v(X
4
τ , Y
4
τ ).
Note that the first four terms are inequality (3.8) evaluated at (X4τ , Y
4
τ ), so the above
argument can be repeated until Case a.1 or Case a.2.4 happens. The second four
terms are inequality (3.4) evaluated at (X4τ , Y
4
τ ), which is non-negative by Lemma 10.
Case a.2.2: A class 1 arrival is rejected by Process 1 and accepted by Process 4. Let
Process 2 accept the arrival and Process 3 reject it. Then the states in four processes
at time τ are (X4τ − 2, Y
4
τ + 2), (X
4
τ − 1, Y
4
τ + 1), (X
4
τ − 1, Y
4
τ + 1), and (X
4
τ , Y
4
τ ),
respectively. Adding and subtracting v(X4τ − 2, Y
4
τ + 1) + v(X
4
τ − 1, Y
4
τ ), we have
B = v(X4τ − 2, Y
4
τ + 2)− v(X
4
τ − 2, Y
4
τ + 1)− v(X
4
τ − 1, Y
4
τ + 1) + v(X
4
τ − 1, Y
4
τ )
+v(X4τ − 2, Y
4
τ + 1)− v(X
4
τ − 1, Y
4
τ + 1)− v(X
4
τ − 1, Y
4
τ ) + v(X
4
τ , Y
4
τ ).
Note that the first four terms are inequality (3.8) evaluated at (X4τ − 2, Y
4
τ ), so the
above argument can be repeated until Case a.1 or Case a.2.4 happens. The second
four terms are inequality (3.9) evaluated at (X4τ − 2, Y
4
τ ), so the argument in part (b)
can be repeated until Case b.1 or Case b.2.1 happens.
Case a.2.3: A class 2 arrival is accepted by Process 1 and rejected by Process 4. Let
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Process 2 accept the arrival and Process 3 reject it. Then the states in four processes
at time τ are (X4τ−1, Y
4
τ +3), (X
4
τ−1, Y
4
τ +2), (X
4
τ , Y
4
τ +1), and (X
4
τ , Y
4
τ ), respectively.
Adding and subtracting v(X4τ − 1, Y
4
τ + 2) + v(X
4
τ , Y
4
τ + 2) + v(X
4
τ , Y
4
τ + 1), we have
B = v(X4τ − 1, Y
4
τ + 3)− v(X
4
τ − 1, Y
4
τ + 2)− v(X
4
τ , Y
4
τ + 2) + v(X
4
τ , Y
4
τ + 1)
+v(X4τ − 1, Y
4
τ + 2)− v(X
4
τ − 1, Y
4
τ + 1)− v(X
4
τ , Y
4
τ + 1) + v(X
4
τ , Y
4
τ )
+v(X4τ − 1, Y
4
τ + 1)− v(X
4
τ − 1, Y
4
τ + 2)− v(X
4
τ , Y
4
τ + 1) + v(X
4
τ , Y
4
τ + 2).
Note that the first four terms and the second four terms are inequality (3.8) evaluated
at (X4τ − 1, Y
4
τ + 1) and (X
4
τ − 1, Y
4
τ ), respectively. So the above argument can be
repeated until Case a.1 or Case a.2.4 happens. The last four terms are inequality
(3.4) evaluated at (X4τ − 1, Y
4
τ + 1), which is non-negative by Lemma 10.
Case a.2.4: A class 2 arrival is rejected by Process 1 and accepted by Process 4. Let
Process 2 accept the arrival and Process 3 reject it. Then the states in four processes
at time τ are (X4τ − 1, Y
4
τ + 1), (X
4
τ − 1, Y
4
τ + 1), (X
4
τ , Y
4
τ ), (X
4
τ , Y
4
τ ), respectively.
Note that Process 1 and 2 couple, so do Process 3 and 4. Therefore B = 0 and hence
(3.8) holds.
(b). Consider (3.9) next.
Define four processes on the same probability space so that they see the same
arrivals and potential services. Process 1 and 4 follow optimal policies and start in
state (i, j + 1) and (i + 2, j), respectively. Process 2 and 3 start in state (i + 1, j)
and (i + 1, j + 1), respectively, and use policies φ2 and φ3 which are described below.
Denote the state of Process k at time t by (Xkt , Y
k
t ), k = 1, 2, 3, 4.
Let β be the first time Process 2 and 3 have 0 class 1 customers. Let τ1 be the
first time Process 4 has 0 class 1 customers. Since service rates are the same for both
classes, Process 1 finishes serving the first class 2 customer at β and the second class
2 customer (if any) at τ1. Process 2 and 3 finish serving the first class 2 customer
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(if any) at τ1. So between β and τ1, Process 1 and 2 have identical customers, and
Process 3 has one more class 2 customer but one less class 1 customer than Process 4.
While Process 4 is serving the last class 1 customer, the servers in Process 1 and 2 are
either serving class 2 customers or idle. In the former case, the rewards generated in
four processes at τ1 are respectively r2, r2, r2, and r1. In the latter case, the rewards
are respectively 0, 0, r2, and r1. Let τ2 be the first time Process 1 and 4 take different
actions. Define τ = min{τ1, τ2}. Let Process 2 and 3 take the same action as Process
1 and 4 upon each arrival until time τ , then follow the optimal policy afterwards.
Case b.1: τ = τ1. Then
v(i, j + 1)− v(i + 1, j)− v(i + 1, j + 1) + v(i + 2, j)
≥ v(i, j + 1)− vφ2(i + 1, j)− vφ3(i + 1, j + 1) + v(i + 2, j)
= E
∫ β
0
e−αt[h(X4t − 2, Y
4
t + 1)− h(X
4
t − 1, Y
4
t )− h(X
4
t − 1, Y
4
t + 1) + h(X
4
t , Y
4
t )]dt
+Ee−αβ(−r2 + r1 + r1 − r1) + E
∫ τ
β
e−αt(h1 − h2)dt + Ee
−ατ (r2 − r1)
+Ee−ατ


[v(0, 0)− v(0, 0)− v(0, 0) + v(0, 0)], if Y 1τ− = Y
2
τ− = 0
[v(0, Y 4τ − 1)− v(0, Y
4
τ − 1)− v(0, Y
4
τ ) + v(0, Y
4
τ )], o.w.
The first term is 0 because of the linear holding cost rate. Using the fact that h1 ≥ h2
and τ ≥ β, one can show that (3.9) holds.
Case b.2: τ = τ2. Then
v(i, j + 1)− v(i + 1, j)− v(i + 1, j + 1) + v(i + 2, j)
≥ v(i, j + 1)− vφ2(i + 1, j)− vφ3(i + 1, j + 1) + v(i + 2, j)
= E
∫ τ
0
e−αt[h(X4t − 2, Y
4
t + 1)− h(X
4
t − 1, Y
4
t )− h(X
4
t − 1, Y
4
t + 1) + h(X
4
t , Y
4
t )]dt
+Ee−ατ (v(X1τ , Y
1
τ )− v(X
2
τ , Y
2
τ )− v(X
3
τ , Y
3
τ ) + v(X
4
τ , Y
4
τ )).
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We have the following possibilities.
Case b.2.1: A class 1 arrival is accepted by Process 1 and rejected by Process 4. Let
Process 2 accept the arrival and Process 3 reject. Then the states in four processes
at τ are (X4τ −1, Y
4
τ +1), (X
4
τ , Y
4
τ ), (X
4
τ −1, Y
4
τ +1), and (X
4
τ , Y
4
τ ), respectively. Note
that Process 1 and 3 couple, so do Process 2 and 4. So (3.9) holds.
Case b.2.2: A class 1 arrival is rejected by Process 1 and accepted by Process 4. Let
Process 2 accept the arrival and Process 3 reject. Then the states in four processes
at τ are (X4τ − 3, Y
4
τ + 1), (X
4
τ − 1, Y
4
τ ), (X
4
τ − 2, Y
4
τ + 1), and (X
4
τ , Y
4
τ ), respectively.
Adding and subtracting v(X4τ − 2, Y
4
τ ) + v(X
4
τ − 2, Y
4
τ + 1) + v(X
4
τ − 1, Y
4
τ + 1), we
have
B = v(X4τ − 3, Y
4
τ + 1)− v(X
4
τ − 2, Y
4
τ )− v(X
4
τ − 2, Y
4
τ + 1) + v(X
4
τ − 1, Y
4
τ )
+v(X4τ − 2, Y
4
τ + 1)− v(X
4
τ − 1, Y
4
τ )− v(X
4
τ − 1, Y
4
τ + 1) + v(X
4
τ , Y
4
τ )
+v(X4τ − 2, Y
4
τ )− v(X
4
τ − 2, Y
4
τ + 1)− v(X
4
τ − 1, Y
4
τ ) + v(X
4
τ − 1, Y
4
τ + 1).
Note that the first four terms and the second four terms are inequality (3.9) evalu-
ated at (X4τ − 3, Y
4
τ ) and (X
4
τ − 2, Y
4
τ ), respectively, so the above argument can be
repeated until Case b.1 or Case b.2.1 happens. The last four terms are inequality
(3.4) evaluated at (X4τ − 2, Y
4
τ ), which is non-negative by Lemma 10.
Case b.2.3: A class 2 arrival is accepted by Process 1 and rejected by Process 4. Let
Process 2 accept the arrival and Process 3 reject. Then the states in four processes at
τ are (X4τ − 2, Y
4
τ + 2), (X
4
τ − 1, Y
4
τ + 1), (X
4
τ − 1, Y
4
τ + 1), and (X
4
τ , Y
4
τ ), respectively.
Adding and subtracting v(X4τ − 2, Y
4
τ + 1) + v(X
4
τ − 1, Y
4
τ ), we have
B = v(X4τ − 2, Y
4
τ + 2)− v(X
4
τ − 1, Y
4
τ + 1)− v(X
4
τ − 2, Y
4
τ + 1) + v(X
4
τ − 1, Y
4
τ )
+v(X4τ − 2, Y
4
τ + 1)− v(X
4
τ − 1, Y
4
τ )− v(X
4
τ − 1, Y
4
τ + 1) + v(X
4
τ , Y
4
τ ).
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Note that the first four terms are inequality (3.8) evaluated at (X4τ − 2, Y
4
τ ), so the
argument in part (a) can be repeated until Case a.1 or Case a.2.4 happens. The second
four terms are inequality (3.9) evaluated at (X4τ − 2, Y
4
τ ), so the above argument can
be repeated until Case b.1 or Case b.2.1 happens.
Case b.2.4: A class 2 arrival is rejected by Process 1 and accepted by Process 4. Let
Process 2 accept the arrival and Process 3 reject. Then the states in four processes
at τ are (X4τ − 2, Y
4
τ ), (X
4
τ − 1, Y
4
τ ), (X
4
τ − 1, Y
4
τ ), and (X
4
τ , Y
4
τ ), respectively. Adding
and subtracting v(X4τ − 2, Y
4
τ + 1) + v(X
4
τ − 1, Y
4
τ + 1), we have
B = v(X4τ − 2, Y
4
τ )− v(X
4
τ − 2, Y
4
τ + 1)− v(X
4
τ − 1, Y
4
τ ) + v(X
4
τ − 1, Y
4
τ + 1)
+v(X4τ − 2, Y
4
τ + 1)− v(X
4
τ − 1, Y
4
τ )− v(X
4
τ − 1, Y
4
τ + 1) + v(X
4
τ , Y
4
τ ).
Note that the first four terms are inequality (3.4) evaluated at (X4τ − 2, Y
4
τ ), which
is non-negative by Lemma 10. The second four terms are inequality (3.9) evaluated
at (X4τ − 2, Y
4
τ ), so the above argument can be repeated until Case b.1 or Case b.2.1
happens.
Corollary 1. If h1 ≥ h2 and r1 ≥ r2, then v is convex in both i and j, i.e.,
v(i + 2, j)− v(i + 1, j) ≥ v(i + 1, j)− v(i, j), (3.10)
v(i, j + 2)− v(i, j + 1) ≥ v(i, j + 1)− v(i, j). (3.11)
Proof. (3.10) is implied by (3.4) and (3.9), and (3.11) is implied by (3.4) and (3.8).
Theorem 12. The socially optimal policy for admitting class 2 customers is char-
acterized by a monotonically decreasing switching curve, i.e., for each i ≥ 0, there
exists a threshold Ls2(i), such that a class 2 arrival in state (i, j) is accepted if and
only if j < Ls2(i). Furthermore, L
s
2(i) is monotonically decreasing in i.
Proof. Using supermodularity and convexity in j, one can prove this theorem by
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following similar argument as in the proof for Theorem 11.
3.4 Class Optimization
We consider class-optimal policies in this section. The objective of a class-optimal
policy for class k, k = 1, 2, is to minimize the expected total discounted net cost
generated by all customers in class k.
3.4.1 Optimal Policies for Class 1
We consider optimal admission control policies for class 1 customers first. Denote
v(i) the expected total discounted net cost generated by a class-optimal policy for
class 1 over an infinite horizon starting from state i, where i is the number of class
1 customers in the system. Note that class 1 customers don’t see class 2 customers
under class optimization because of their higher priority. Thus, after uniformizing,
the optimality equation can be written as
v(i) = h1i + λ1 min{v(i), v(i + 1)}+ µv((i− 1)
+ − r1I{i≥1}). (3.12)
Lemma 13. v(1)− v(0) + r1 ≥ 0.
Proof. Define two processes on the same probability space so that they see the same
arrivals and potential services. Process 1 starts with 1 class 1 customer and follows
optimal policy. Process 2 starts with 0 class 1 customers and follows policy φ which
is described below. Let τ be the first time Process 1 has 0 class 1 customers. Let
Process 2 take the same action as Process 1 upon each arrival until time τ , then follow
the optimal policy afterwards. Therefore, Process 1 has one more class 1 customer
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than Process 2 until time τ . Two processes become identical from then on. Thus,
v(1)− v(0) ≥ v(1)− vφ(0)
= E
∫ τ
0
e−αth1dt + Ee
−ατ (−r1 + v(0)− v(0))
≥ −r1Ee
−ατ ≥ −r1.
Lemma 14. v is convex, i.e.,
v(i + 2)− v(i + 1)− v(i + 1) + v(i) ≥ 0. (3.13)
Proof. Define four processes on the same probability space so that they see the same
arrivals and potential services. Process 1 and 4 follow optimal policies and start in
state i + 2 and i, respectively. Process 2 and 3 start in state i + 1 and use policies
φ2 and φ3, respectively, which are described below. Denote the state of Process k at
time t by (Xkt , Y
k
t ), k = 1, 2, 3, 4.
Let τ1 be the first time Process 2 and 3 have 0 class 1 customers. Let τ2 be the
first time Process 1 and 4 take different actions. Define τ = min{τ1, τ2}. Let Process
2 and 3 take the same action as Process 1 and 4 upon each arrival until time τ , then
follow the optimal policy afterwards. Thus
v(i + 2)− v(i + 1)− v(i + 1) + v(i)
≥ v(i + 2)− vφ2(i + 1)− vφ3(i + 1) + v(i)
= E
∫ τ
0
e−αt[h(X4t + 2)− h(X
4
t + 1)− h(X
4
t + 1) + h(X
4
t )]dt
+Ee−ατ (−R1 + R2 + R3 − R4) + Ee
−ατ (v(X1τ )− v(X
2
τ )− v(X
3
τ ) + v(X
4
τ )),
where Ri is the potential reward generated in Process i at time τ . It can be easily
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seen that the first term is 0 because of the linear holding cost rate.
To simplify notation, define
D¯ = v(i + 2)− v(i + 1)− v(i + 1) + v(i), (3.14)
B¯ = v(X1τ )− v(X
2
τ )− v(X
3
τ ) + v(X
4
τ ). (3.15)
Also define A as in (3.6).
Case 1: τ = τ1. Then the states in four processes at τ are 1, 0, 0, 0, respectively.
The rewards generated at τ are R1 = R2 = R3 = r1, and R4 = 0. Therefore,
D¯ ≥ Ee−ατ (v(1)− v(0) + r1) ≥ 0,
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 13.
Case 2: τ = τ2. Then A = 0. We have the following possibilities.
Case 2.1: A class 1 arrival is accepted by Process 1 and rejected by Process 4. Let
Process 2 accept and Process 3 reject the arrival. Then the states in four processes
at τ are X4τ +3, X
4
τ +2, X
4
τ +1, X
4
τ , respectively. Adding and subtracting v(X
4
τ +1)+
v(X4τ + 2), we have
B¯ = v(X4τ + 3)− v(X
4
τ + 2)− v(X
4
τ + 2) + v(X
4
τ + 1)
+v(X4τ + 2)− v(X
4
τ + 1)− v(X
4
τ + 1) + v(X
4
τ ).
Note that the first four terms and the second four terms are inequality (3.13) evaluated
at X4τ + 1 and X
4
τ , respectively. So the above argument can be repeated until Case 1
or Case 2.2 happens.
Case 2.2: A class 1 arrival is rejected by Process 1 and accepted by Process 4. Let
Process 2 accept and Process 3 reject the arrival. Then the states in four processes
at τ are X4τ + 2, X
4
τ + 2, X
4
τ + 1, X
4
τ + 1, respectively. Notice that Process 1 and 2
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couple, so do Process 3 and 4. So B¯ = 0 and hence (3.13) holds.
Theorem 13. The class-optimal policy for admitting class 1 customers is character-
ized by a critical number, i.e., there exists a threshold Lc1, such that a class 1 arrival
in state i is accepted if and only if i < Lc1.
Proof. Define
Lc1 = min{i : v(i + 1) > v(i)}.
Using Lemma 14 one can easily show that a class 1 arrival is accepted if and only if
i < Lc1.
3.4.2 Optimal Policies for Class 2
We consider optimal admission control policies for class 2 customers next. Denote
v(i, j) the expected total discounted net cost generated by a class-optimal policy for
class 2 over an infinite horizon starting from state (i, j). Assuming class 1 customers
are admitted according to the class-optimal policy for class 1, the optimality equation
can be written as
v(i, j) = h2j + λ1


v(i + 1, j), if i < Lc1
v(i, j), if i >= Lc1
+ λ2 min{v(i, j + 1), v(i, j)}
+µ


v(i− 1, j), if i ≥ 1
v(0, j − 1)− r2, if i = 0, j ≥ 1
v(0, 0), if i = 0, j = 0.
(3.16)
Lemma 15. v(0, 1)− v(0, 0) + r2 ≥ 0.
Proof. Same argument as in the proof for Lemma 9 applies.
Lemma 16. v is convex in j, i.e.,
v(i, j + 2)− v(i, j + 1)− v(i, j + 1) + v(i, j) ≥ 0. (3.17)
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Proof. Same argument as in the proof for Lemma 14 applies after the following
changes. Replace class 1 by class 2. Replace v(i) by v(i, j), v(i + 1) by v(i, j + 1),
etc. Replace r1 by r2.
Lemma 17. v is supermodular, i.e.,
v(i + 1, j + 1)− v(i, j + 1)− v(i + 1, j) + v(i, j) ≥ 0. (3.18)
Proof. Same argument as in the proof for Lemma 10 applies after the following
changes. No reward is generated when a class 1 customer finishes service, i.e., r1 = 0.
Case 2.1 does not exist, since a class 1 arrival is always accepted in state (i, j) if it is
accepted in state (i + 1, j). Case 2.2 is the same as in Lemma 10 except that it only
happens when i = Lc1 − 1.
Theorem 14. The class-optimal policy for admitting class 2 customers is character-
ized by a monotonically decreasing switching curve, i.e., for each i ≥ 0, there exists
a threshold Lc2(i), such that a class 2 arrival in state (i, j) is accepted if and only if
j < Lc2(i). Furthermore, L
c
2(i) is monotonically decreasing in i.
Proof. Using supermodularity and convexity in j, one can prove this theorem by
following similar argument as in the proof for Theorem 11.
3.5 Numerical Comparison
We compare policies under different criteria numerically in this section. The numer-
ical examples are computed by truncating the state space and using standard value
iteration algorithm as described in Section 2.6.
Figure 3.1 plots the cost of class-optimal policy for class 1 customers against
i, the number of class 1 customers in starting state. Figure 3.2 plots the cost of
class-optimal policy for class 2 customers against j, the number of class 2 customers
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in starting state, for different i. Figure 3.1 and 3.2 use the following parameters
α = 0.2, µ = 0.5, λ1 = 0.15, λ2 = 0.15, h1 = 0.3, h2 = 0.2, r1 = 25, r2 = 18. Note
that the class-optimal value function is not monotone in i or j in this case, while the
monotonicities ((2.12), (2.13)) hold for the case where the reward is generated at the
time of joining the queue.
Figure 3.3 and 3.4 plot the cost of socially optimal policy against i and j for fixed
j and i, respectively. They use the same parameters as in Figure 3.1 and 3.2 except
that r1 = 15, r2 = 10. The socially optimal value function is not monotone in i or j
as contrary to the model discussed in Chapter 2. So moving the reward time changes
the nature of the problem.
Figure 3.5 and 3.6 plot the switching curves under three optimization criteria
for class 1 and class 2, respectively. Figure 3.5 uses the following parameters α =
0.1, µ = 0.5, λ1 = 0.1, λ2 = 0.3, h1 = 25, h2 = 20, r1 = 450, r2 = 300. Figure 3.6 uses
the following parameters α = 0.1, µ = 0.5, λ1 = 0.39, λ2 = 0.01, h1 = 2, h2 = 0.3, r1 =
550, r2 = 500.
Note that for class 1 (higher priority) customer, individually optimal policy accepts
the most and socially optimal policy accepts the least number of customers. For class
2 (lower priority) customer, socially optimal policy accepts more customers than
class optimal policy, which is the exact opposite to the comparison result for class
1. Depending on the parameters, individually optimal policy can accept either more
or fewer customers than either of the other two policies. The above observations
agree with the results we obtained for the previous model. The intuitive explanation
provided for the previous model also applies here.
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Figure 3.1: Class optimization for class 1: v against i
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Figure 3.2: Class optimization for class 2: v against j for fixed i
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Figure 3.3: Social optimization: v against i for fixed j
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Figure 3.4: Social optimization: v against j for fixed i
66
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Switching curves for admitting class 1 customers
j (# class 2 customers)
co
nt
ro
l li
m
it
Individual
Class     
Social    
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Chapter 4
Dynamic Routing
4.1 Problem Description
In this chapter, we consider the dynamic warranty repair allocation problem. Assume
sales of class k items form a Poisson process with rate λk, denoted by PP (λk), k = 1, 2.
Warranty length for either class is a constant W . The manufacturer outsources the
warranty repairs to V vendors (one of them could be the manufacturer’s facility itself).
The life times of the items are i.i.d. exp(β) random variables. When an item fails
while it is under warranty, it is sent to one of the V vendors for repair. There is
one repair person at each vendor. The repair times are i.i.d. exp(µi) at vendor i
(same for both classes). Class 1 items have preemptive resume priority over class 2
items in repair service. The manufacturer pays vendor i a fixed fee ci each time a
repair is assigned to vendor i, i = 1, · · · , V . While a class k item is awaiting or under
repair at vendor i, the manufacturer incurs a holding cost (good will cost) at rate
hki, k = 1, 2, i = 1, · · · , V . We assume items covered by higher priority warranty
generate holding cost at a higher rate, i.e., h1i ≥ h2i, i = 1, · · · , V . This situation
agrees with the way the well-known c-µ rule assigns priorities to multiple classes of
jobs at a single service station, i.e, higher priority is given to the class with larger c-µ
ratio (c is the holding cost rate in our case). Items are as good as new after repair.
The goal of the manufacturer is to assign repairs to vendors in such a way that the
expected long-run average cost is minimized.
The complexity of the problem prevents us from finding optimal policies. Hence
we turn our attention to heuristic allocation procedures. One natural way of ob-
taining an approximate solution is to simplify the problem by assuming exponential
warranty length and formulate it as an Markov decision process (MDP). The opti-
mal policy for the resulting MDP can be expected to work reasonably well for the
original problem. However, the curse of dimensionality (of the state space) makes
solving the Bellman equations of the MDP impractical even for small-size problems.
We present four heuristics that are applicable to large problems. Among the four
heuristics, the Generalized Join the Shortest Queue (GJSQ) policy is of our primary
interest. The GJSQ policy is derived by applying a single policy improvement step
to an judiciously chosen initial state-independent policy. We first develop the GJSQ
policy then evaluate and compare it with other heuristics using simulation.
4.2 Heuristics
4.2.1 Optimal State-Independent Policy (OSI)
We first consider state-independent policies, i.e., stationary policies that do not de-
pend on the real-time system state. We confine ourselves to a specific, yet natural,
type of state-independent policy, namely, a Bernoulli splitting policy. Under this pol-
icy, a type k repair is assigned to vendor i with probability pki, where
∑V
i=1 pki = 1,
k = 1, 2. Let pk = (pk1, pk2, · · · , pkV ), k = 1, 2. Then the Bernoulli splitting policy
can be denoted by (p1, p2). We aim to find an optimal Bernoulli splitting policy that
minimizes the long-run average cost. In order to compute the long-run average cost
of a Bernoulli splitting policy with splitting probabilities (p1, p2), we simplify the real
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system by assuming that failures of type k items under warranty occur according to a
PP (φk), where φk = λkWβ (or, equivalently, the number of type k functioning items
under warranty is a constant λkW ). Then type k repairs arrive at vendor i according
to a PP (φkpki). We assume
∑V
i=1 µi > φ1 + φ2, i.e., the total arrival rate of failed
items is less than the total service rate. As a result, there must exist policies (p1, p2)
such that φ1p1i + φ2p2i < µi, i = 1, ..., V . We only consider such stable policies for
the rest of the paper.
Because of their preemptive resume priority, type 1 items simply do not see type
2 items in the repair queue. So the expected number of type 1 items at vendor i is
L1i(p1i) = φ1p1i/(µi − φ1p1i). (4.1)
Obviously, the expected number of all items at vendor i is (φ1p1i+φ2p2i)/(µi−(φ1p1i+
φ2p2i)). Hence the expected number of type 2 items at vendor i is
L2i(p1i, p2i) =
φ1p1i + φ2p2i
µi − (φ1p1i + φ2p2i)
−
φ1p1i
µi − φ1p1i
. (4.2)
Let
f1i(x) =


(h1i − h2i)
x
µi−x
, if x < µi
∞, if x ≥ µi,
(4.3)
f2i(x) =


cix + h2i
x
µi−x
, if x < µi
∞, if x ≥ µi,
(4.4)
and
fi(x1, x2) = f1i(x1) + f2i(x1 + x2). (4.5)
Then the long-run average cost rate at vendor i is fi(φ1p1i, φ2p2i).
Therefore, the optimal Bernoulli splitting policy (p∗1, p
∗
2) can be obtained by solv-
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ing the following optimization problem:
min
V∑
i=1
fi(φ1p1i, φ2p2i)
s.t.
V∑
i=1
pki = 1, k = 1, 2 (4.6)
pki ≥ 0, k = 1, 2, i = 1, 2, · · · , V.
Note that the objective function is separable in terms of pairs (p1i, p2i), i.e., it is
a sum of functions of two variables (p1i, p2i) each. Each single term can be further
decomposed as in (4.5). To take advantage of the structure of this problem and
apply simple and efficient algorithm, we solve the discretized version of the above
optimization problem as described in the following. Suppose λkW are integers, k =
1, 2. Otherwise, take their integer parts. Associate a pair of integers (y1i, y2i) with
each vendor, where
∑V
i=1 yki = λkW , and let pki =
yki
λkW
, k = 1, 2, i = 1, 2, · · · , V .
This can be interpreted in the following way: Assume that there are λkW type k items
under warranty. Assign yki of them to vendor i and always send them to vendor i for
repair upon failure. In terms of (y1i, y2i), the long-run average cost rate at vendor i
is fi(y1iβ, y2iβ), where fi is defined in (4.5).
Therefore, the discretized version of (4.6) can be written as
min
V∑
i=1
f1i(y1iβ) + f2i(y1iβ + y2iβ)
s.t.
V∑
i=1
yki = λkW, k = 1, 2 (4.7)
yki ≥ 0 and integer, k = 1, 2, i = 1, 2, · · · , V.
Optimization problem (4.7) can be formulated as a minimum cost network flow
problem which can be solved by a Successive Shortest Path Algorithm with complexity
O(V +(λ1 +λ2)W log V ) (see Buczkowski et al. [9], and Ahuja et al. [2]). We provide
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Figure 4.1: Network model of two-priority problem
the formulation and algorithm here for ready reference.
Figure 4.1 shows the network model for (4.7). There are two source nodes s1, s2
with supplies of λ1W and λ2W , respectively. There is one sink node t with a demand
of (λ1 +λ2)W . All other nodes are transshipment nodes with 0 demand and 0 supply.
The arc properties are summarized in table 4.1.
Arc Capacity Flow Cost
(si, j
i) λiW yij 0
(j1, j2) λ1W y1j f1j(y1jβ)
(j2, t) (λ1 + λ2)W y1j + y2j f2j((y1j + y2j)β)
Table 4.1: Arc properties for the network representation of (4.7)
Define yk = (yk1, · · · , ykV ), k = 1, 2, y = (y1, y2) and δf(yβ) = f(yβ)− f((y −
1)β), y ≥ 1. The following algorithm can be used to solve the network problem.
Successive Shortest Path Algorithm:
Initialize y := 0;
while
∑V
i=1 y2i < λ2W do
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• compute minj=1,...,V δf2j((y2j + 1)β),
• increment y2k by 1, where k ∈ arg minj=1,...,V δf2j((y2j + 1)β);
end
while
∑V
i=1 y1i < λ1W do
• compute di = δf1i((y1i + 1)β) + δf2i((y1i + y2i + 1)β), i = 1, ..., V
and dV +1 = miny2j>0 δf1j((y1j +1)β)+minj=1,...,V δf2j((y1j +y2j +
1)β).
• let q ∈ arg minj=1,..,V +1 dj.
If q ∈ {1, ..., V }, increment y1q by 1.
If q = V + 1, let k ∈ arg miny2j>0 δf1j((y1j + 1)β) and
p ∈ arg minj=1,...,V δf2j((y1j + y2j + 1)β). Increment y1k and y2p
by 1 and decrement y2k by 1 unit.
end
Denote the optimal solution to (4.7) by (y∗1i, y
∗
2i), then we have the following approx-
imate solution to (4.6):
p∗1i =
y∗1i
λ1W
, p∗2i =
y∗2i
λ2W
, i = 1, 2, · · · , V. (4.8)
Note that p∗ki is an optimal solution to (4.6) to a degree of accuracy of
1
λkW
, k = 1, 2,
i = 1, . . . , V . The expected numbers of items under warranty, λkW , are usually large
in real problems, in which case, the discretized solution is very close to the real-valued
optimal solution.
4.2.2 Generalized Join the Shortest Queue Policy (GJSQ)
We continue to assume that the number of type k functioning items under warranty
is a constant λkW and failures of type k items under warranty occur according to
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a PP (φk), where φk = λkWβ, k = 1, 2. Therefore, the original warranty repair
allocation problem reduces to the problem of routing items arriving according to two
independent Poisson streams to several vendors where service is provided according
to a predetermined priority policy.
A generalized model of this situation is studied by Ansell et al. [3]. In their
model, jobs from a number of different classes arrive according to independent Poisson
processes. Jobs are either generic or dedicated, and they are routed to a set of service
stations. Dedicated jobs can be processed only by a specified station, while generic
jobs can be processed at any station. Jobs are served according to a static priority
policy at each station. A holding cost is incurred at a class-dependent rate while a
job is in the system. The objective is to minimize the long-run average holding cost
rate. The authors develop a dynamic routing heuristic by applying a single policy
improvement step to an initial static policy (see also Krishnan [23] and Tijms [45] for
this approach). They name the resulting index-based heuristic “Generalized Join the
Shortest Queue”(GJSQ) policy. We provide their main result here for ready reference.
Denote the set of generic jobs by G and the set of dedicated jobs to station i by
Di. Denote the number of class k jobs that are currently awaiting or under service
at station i by xki, k ∈ G ∪ Di, i = 1, · · · , V . Let x
i = {xki|k ∈ G ∪ Di}. For each
class k, the GJSQ policy associates with each station i an index Iki which is a linear
function of the number of jobs of each class at station i, i.e.,
Iki(x
i) =
∑
l∈G∪Di
θiklxli + δ
i
k, k ∈ G ∪Di, i = 1, · · · , V,
where the coefficients θikl and δ
i
k are constants. The GJSQ policy routes an incoming
class k job to the station with the smallest index.
Although structurally the simplified version of our problem is a special case of that
studied by Ansell et al. [3] (we consider two generic classes and no dedicated classes),
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our approach differs from theirs in the following ways: In addition to holding cost, we
also allow a station-dependent fixed cost per assignment, which is not considered by
Ansell et al. [3]. Furthermore, we are able to give tractable closed-form expressions
for the coefficients following complicated queueing theoretic calculations, while in
Ansell et al. [3] the coefficients are given as a solution to an infinite set of recursive
equations.
We use the solution (p∗1, p
∗
2) given in (4.8) as the initial state-independent policy.
Following Ansell et al. [3], we show that the linear structure of the indices continues
to hold in the presence of fixed costs. In particular, for our problem there exist two
indices I1j(x1j , x2j) and I2j(x1j , x2j) for each vendor j = 1, . . . , V of the following
form
I1j(x1j , x2j) = A1j + B1jx1j + C1jx2j , (4.9)
I2j(x1j , x2j) = A2j + B2jx1j + C2jx2j . (4.10)
After some lengthy algebra, we get the closed-form expressions for the coefficients
of the indices. We introduce the following notations before stating the theorem:
φkj = φkp
∗
kj, (4.11)
ηj =
1
µj − φ1j
, (4.12)
ξj =
1
µj − φ1j − φ2j
, (4.13)
where k = 1, 2, j = 1, . . . , V .
Theorem 15. Assume µj > φ1j + φ2j and let fj, φkj, ηj and ξj be as given in (4.5),
(4.11), (4.12), and (4.13), respectively. Then the coefficients of the indices defined in
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(4.9) and (4.10) are given by
A1j = cj + [cj(φ1j + φ2j) + h1j ]ηj + fj(φ1j, φ2j)ξj + (φ1jh1j +
1
2
φ2jh2j)η
2
j
+[cj(φ1j + φ2j)φ2j + φ2jh2j ]ηjξj +
1
2
(φ1j + µj)φ2jh2jη
3
j
+(φ1jφ2jh1j +
1
2
φ22jh2j)η
2
j ξj +
1
2
(φ1j + µj)φ
2
2jh2η
3
j ξj + φ
2
2jµjh2jη
2
j ξ
2
j ,
B1j = h1jηj + φ2jh2jη
2
j + φ
2
2jh2jη
2
j ξj,
C1j = h2jηj + φ2jh2jηjξj,
A2j = cj + [cj(φ1j + φ2j) + h2j + fj(φ1j, φ2j)]ξj + φ1jh1jηjξj + φ2jµjh2jηjξ
2
j ,
B2j = h2jηj + φ2jh2jηjξj,
C2j = h2jξj.
Proof. Assume that the number of type k functioning items under warranty is a
constant λkW and failures of type k items under warranty occur according to a
PP (φk), where φk = λkWβ, k = 1, 2. Denote by g
∗ the long-run average cost rate
incurred by the manufacturer under policy (p∗1, p
∗
2). Denote by ω
∗(x1, x2) the bias
associated with policy (p∗1, p
∗
2) starting from state (x1, x2). Rescaling the time scale
so that φ1 + φ2 +
∑V
i=1 µi = 1, the optimality equation can be written as
g∗ + ω∗(x1, x2)
=
V∑
i=1
(h1ix1i + h2ix2i) +
V∑
i=1


µiω
∗(x1 − ei, x2), if x1i ≥ 1
µiω
∗(x1, x2 − ei), if x1i = 0, x2i ≥ 1
µiω
∗(x1, x2), if x1i = 0, x2i = 0
+ φ1
V∑
i=1
p∗1i(ci + ω
∗(x1 + ei, x2)) + φ2
V∑
i=1
p∗2i(ci + ω
∗(x1, x2 + ei)) (4.14)
We improve the policy (p∗1, p
∗
2) by applying one step of policy-improvement, which
works as follows. When a type k item fails, we send it to the vendor where the cost
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increment caused by assigning one more type k repair is the smallest assuming that
policy (p∗1, p
∗
2) is applied forever afterwards, k = 1, 2. Therefore, if a type 1 item
fails in state (x1, x2), we find vendor index j
∗ ∈ arg minj{cj + ω
∗(x1 + ej, x2)}
or equivalently j∗ ∈ arg minj{cj + ω
∗(x1 + ej, x2) − ω
∗(x1, x2)}. If a type 2 item
fails in state (x1, x2), we find vendor index j
∗ ∈ arg minj{cj + ω
∗(x1, x2 + ej)} or
equivalently j∗ ∈ arg minj{cj + ω
∗(x1, x2 + ej) − ω
∗(x1, x2)}. Then send the repair
to vendor j∗. Next we turn to the computation of ω∗(x1 + ej, x2) − ω
∗(x1, x2) and
ω∗(x1, x2 + ej)− ω
∗(x1, x2).
Let vT (x1, x2) be the total expected cost of policy (p
∗
1, p
∗
2) up to time T starting
in state (x1, x2) at time 0. From Puterman [39], we have
ω∗(x1 + ej, x2)− ω
∗(x1, x2) = lim
T→∞
[vT (x1 + ej, x2)− vT (x1, x2)]. (4.15)
Let viT (x1i, x2i) be the total expected cost incurred at vendor i by policy (p
∗
1, p
∗
2) up
to time T . Then we have vT (x1, x2) =
∑V
i=1 viT (x1i, x2i).
Denote by g∗i the expected cost rate at vendor i in steady state under policy
(p∗1, p
∗
2), then
g∗i = fi(φ1p
∗
1i, φ2p
∗
2i), (4.16)
where fi is defined in (4.5). Since the system reaches steady state eventually under
any stable policy, viT (x1i, x2i) asymptotically converges to a straight line with slope
g∗i as T →∞, i.e.,
viT (x1i, x2i) = bi,(x1i,x2i) + g
∗
i T + O(T ), (4.17)
where bi,(x1i,x2i) is the intercept of the asymptote and limT→∞ O(T ) = 0.
Let Ti(x1i, x2i) be the time it takes vendor i to reach state (0, 0) for the first time
from initial state (x1i, x2i) and let τi(x1i, x2i) = E[Ti(x1i, x2i)]. Let Ji(x1i, x2i) be the
expected cost incurred by vendor i starting from initial state (x1i, x2i) until the first
time vendor i reaches state (0, 0). Introduce notation a ∧ b = min{a, b}. As T →∞,
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we have
viT (x1i, x2i)
= ETi(x1i,x2i)[vi(T∧Ti(x1i,x2i))(x1i, x2i)] + ETi(x1i,x2i)[vi(T−Ti(x1i,x2i))(0, 0)]
= Ji(x1i, x2i) + O(T ) + ETi(x1i,x2i)[bi,(0,0) + g
∗
i (T − Ti(x1i, x2i)) + O(T − Ti(x1i, x2i))]
= Ji(x1i, x2i) + viT (0, 0)− g
∗
i τi(x1i, x2i) + O(T ).
Therefore,
vT (x1 + ej, x2)− vT (x1, x2)
=
V∑
i=1
i6=j
viT (x1i, x2i) + vjT (x1j + 1, x2j)−
V∑
i=1
viT (x1i, x2i)
= vjT (x1j + 1, x2j)− vjT (x1j , x2j)
= Jj(x1j + 1, x2j) + vjT (0, 0)− g
∗
j τj(x1j + 1, x2j) + O(T )
−(Jj(x1j , x2j) + vjT (0, 0)− g
∗
j τj(x1j , x2j) + O(T ))
= Jj(x1j + 1, x2j)− Jj(x1j , x2j)− g
∗
j [τj(x1j + 1, x2j)− τj(x1j , x2j)] + O(T ).
Substituting the above expression in (4.15), we have
ω∗(x1+ej, x2)−ω
∗(x1, x2) = Jj(x1j+1, x2j)−Jj(x1j , x2j)−g
∗
j [τj(x1j+1, x2j)−τj(x1j , x2j)].
Define the type 1 index at vendor j as
I1j(x1j , x2j) = cj + Jj(x1j + 1, x2j)− Jj(x1j , x2j)− g
∗
j [τj(x1j + 1, x2j)− τj(x1j , x2j)].
(4.18)
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Similarly, the type 2 index at vendor j can be defined as
I2j(x1j , x2j) = cj + Jj(x1j , x2j + 1)− Jj(x1j , x2j)− g
∗
j [τj(x1j , x2j + 1)− τj(x1j , x2j)].
(4.19)
Ikj(x1j , x2j) can be viewed as the cost increment at vendor j caused by assigning one
type k repair to vendor j in state (x1j , x2j) assuming that policy (p
∗
1, p
∗
2) is applied
forever afterwards. When a type k item fails, it is sent to the vendor whose type k
index is the smallest.
Next, we derive closed-form expressions for the indices defined in (4.18) and (4.19).
Consider a fixed vendor, i.e., vendor i for a fixed i. For notational simplicity, we drop
the vendor suffix i. Thus, the single vendor can be viewed as the following queueing
system. Two types of failed items arrive at a single-server queue according to PP (φk),
k = 1, 2, respectively. Repair times are i.i.d. exp(µ) for both types of items. Type 1
items have preemptive resume priority in service over type 2 items. Each failed type
k item incurs a holding cost at rate hk throughout its sojourn time at the vendor
and a fixed cost c, k = 1, 2. We are interested in computing J(x1, x2), the expected
total cost incurred by this queueing system starting from initial state (x1, x2) until
the first time it reaches state (0, 0). We use the following notations in the rest of this
appendix:
Xk(t) = number of type k items in the system at time t, k = 1, 2;
B1 = min{t ≥ 0 : X1(t) = 0|X1(0) = 1}, i.e., the busy period for serving
type 1 items initiated by a single type 1 item;
B2 = min{t ≥ 0 : X2(t) = 0|X1(0) = 0, X2(0) = 1}, i.e., the busy period
for serving both types of items initiated by a single type 2 item;
S2 = the service completion time of a type 2 item accounting for interrup-
tions from type 1 items. Thus if a type 2 item starts service at time
0, it will complete service at time S2;
79
L1 = limt→∞ E(X1(t)), i.e., the expected number of type 1 items in the
system;
L1B = E[
∫ B1
0
X1(t)dt]/E(B1), i.e., the expected number of type 1 items
in the system during B1;
L2 = limt→∞ E(X2(t)), i.e., the expected number of type 2 items in the
system;
C11 = the expected holding cost incurred by the type 1 items during B1;
C12 = the expected holding cost incurred by the type 1 items during S2;
T1(x1) = min{t ≥ 0 : X1(t) = 0|X1(0) = x1};
T (x1, x2) = min{t ≥ 0 : X1(t) = 0, X2(t) = 0|X1(0) = x1, X2(0) = x2};
τ1(x1) = E(T1(x1));
τ(x1, x2) = E(T (x1, x2));
H1(x1, x2) = the expected total holding cost incurred by the system start-
ing from initial state (x1, x2) until time T1(x1);
H2(x1, x2) = the expected total holding cost incurred by the system from
time T1(x1) until time T (x1, x2);
H(x1, x2) = the expected total holding cost incurred by the system start-
ing from initial state (x1, x2) until time T (x1, x2).
Also let ρ1 =
φ1
µ
, ρ2 = φ2E(S2), η =
1
µ−φ1
, ξ = 1
µ−φ1−φ2
.
Assuming φ1 > 0 (otherwise, the problem reduces to a single-priority problem),
from Prabhu [38] (Chapter 3, Theorem 1) we have
E(B1) =
1
µ− φ1
, (4.20)
and
V ar(B1) =
φ1 + µ
(µ− φ1)3
. (4.21)
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Obviously,
H(x1, x2) = H1(x1, x2) + H2(x1, x2)
The following two lemmas compute H1(x1, x2) and H2(x1, x2), respectively.
Lemma 18.
H1(x1, x2) = [
1
2
h1η + φ1h1η
2 +
1
2
(φ1 + µ)φ2h2η
3]x1 +
1
2
(h1η + φ2h2η
2)x21 + h2ηx1x2.
(4.22)
Proof. Since type 1 items do not see type 2 items in the repair queue, we have
L1 =
ρ1
1− ρ1
=
φ1
µ− φ1
. (4.23)
Note that ρ1 is the fraction of time that the server is busy serving type 1 items,
therefore
L1B =
L1
ρ1
=
µ
µ− φ1
. (4.24)
By definitions of L1B and B1, we have
C11 = h1L1BE(B1), (4.25)
where E(B1) is given by (4.20).
To simplify analysis, we assume that the vendor follows Last-Come-First-Served
(LCFS) preemptive service discipline within class 1 items. The assumption of LCFS
service discipline is valid because we are interested in total cost, which is independent
of the order of service within each class.The assumption of preemption is valid because
of the exponential service times. Then H1(x1, x2) can be written as the sum of four
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parts as follows.
H1(x1, x2) = C11x1 + h1E(B1)
x1∑
i=1
(i− 1) + h2E(B1)x1x2 +
1
2
φ2h2E(T
2
1 (x1)). (4.26)
The first term includes the holding cost incurred by every initial type 1 item during
the busy period initiated by itself and the holding cost incurred by all type 1 items
arrive during this busy period. The second term is the holding cost incurred by the
initial type 1 items before the busy periods initiated by themselves, since the ith initial
type 1 item waits for an expected (i− 1)B1 amount of time before its service starts,
i = 1, 2, · · · , x1. The third term is the holding cost incurred by x2 initial type 2 items
during [0, T1(x1)), since the expected waiting time for each of them is x1B1. The last
term is the holding cost incurred by newly arrived type 2 items during [0, T1(x1)),
since, conditioned on T1(x1) = t, the expected number of type 2 items arrived during
[0, t) is φ2t and the expected waiting time for each of them during [0, t) is
1
2
t.
Note that T1(x1) is the busy period for serving type 1 items initiated by x1 type
1 items. Thus
E(T 21 (x1)) = V ar(T1(x1)) + E
2(T1(x1)) = x1V ar(B1) + (x1E(B1))
2, (4.27)
where E(B1) and V ar(B1) are given by (4.20) and (4.21).
Substituting (4.20), (4.24), (4.25), and (4.27) into (4.26), after some algebra one
can show (4.22) holds.
Lemma 19.
H2(x1, x2) = [φ1φ2h1η
2ξ +
1
2
h2ξ(2φ2η + (µ + φ1)φ
2
2η
3) + φ22h2µη
2ξ2]x1
+ (φ1h1ηξ +
1
2
h2ξ + φ2h2µηξ
2)x2 +
1
2
φ22h2η
2ξx21 + φ2h2ηξx1x2 +
1
2
h2ξx
2
2.
(4.28)
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Proof. Because of its lower priority, a type 2 item’s service may be interrupted by
newly arrived type 1 items. The expected number of interruptions during one service
completion time is φ1
µ
and each interruption lasts for B1 amount of time. Hence,
C12 =
φ1
µ
h1L1BE(B1). (4.29)
Since the service of a type 2 item can only be interrupted by newly arrived type 1 items
and items of both types require the same service time, S2 has the same distribution
as B1. So
E(S2) = E(B1) = η, (4.30)
and
V ar(S2) = V ar(B1) = (φ1 + µ)η
3.
Type 2 items view the system as an M/G/1 queue with PP (φ2) arrival and i.i.d.
service times with mean E(S2) and variance V ar(S2). From Kulkarni [24] (Theorem
7.11), we know
L2 = ρ2 +
ρ22
2(1− ρ2)
(1 +
V ar(S2)
E2(S2)
) = φ2η + φ
2
2µη
2ξ. (4.31)
From Prabhu [38] (Chapter 7, Theorem 8), we have
E(B2) =
1
µ− φ1 − φ2
. (4.32)
The system state at time T1(x1) can be written as (0, x2 + K), where K is the
number of type 2 items arrive during [0, T1(x1)). For a fixed K, denote by H2K the
holding cost incurred by the queueing system starting from state (0, x2 + K) until
state (0, 0) is reached. Assuming LCFS preemptive service discipline within class 2
83
items, H2K can be written as the sum of three parts as follows.
H2K = (x2 + K)
E(B2)
E(S2)
C12 + (x2 + K)h2E(B2)
L2
ρ2
+ h2E(B2)
x2+K∑
i=1
(i− 1). (4.33)
The first term is the holding cost incurred by all type 1 items during this period,
since E(B2)
E(S2)
is the expected total number of type 2 items served during B2. The
second term includes the holding cost incurred by every existing type 2 item during
the busy period initiated by itself and the holding cost incurred by all type 2 items
arrive during this busy period, since L2
ρ2
is the average number of type 2 items in the
system during a busy period initiated by a single type 2 item. The third term is the
holding cost incurred by the x2 +K existing type 2 customers before the busy periods
initiated by themselves, since the ith existing type 2 customer waits for an expected
(i− 1)E(B2) amount of time before its service starts.
Substituting (4.29), (4.30), (4.31), and (4.32) into (4.33), after some algebra, we
get
H2K = Kφ1h1ηξ +
1
2
h2K(K + 1)ξ + Kh2φ2µηξ
2
+[h1φ1ηξ +
1
2
h2(2K + 1)ξ + h2φ2µηξ
2]x2 +
1
2
h2ξx
2
2 (4.34)
For K, the number of type 2 items arrive during the busy period started by x1
type 1 items, we have
E(K) = x1E(B1)φ2, (4.35)
and
E(K2) = E[E(K2|T1(x1))] = E[V ar(K|T1(x1)) + E
2(K|T1(x1))]
= E(φ2T1(x1) + φ
2
2T
2
1 (x1)) = φ2E(T1(x1)) + φ
2
2E(T
2
1 (x1)).
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Plugging in (4.27), we get
E(K2) = [φ2η + φ
2
2(φ1 + µ)η
3]x1 + φ
2
2η
2x21. (4.36)
Obviously, H2(x1, x2) = EK(H2K). Taking expectation on both sides of (4.34)
with respect to K and plugging in (4.35) and (4.36), one can show that (4.28) holds.
The above results allow us to compute J(x1, x2) as given in the following lemma.
Lemma 20.
J(x1, x2) = Ax1 + Bx2 + Cx
2
1 + Dx1x2 + Ex
2
2, (4.37)
where
A = [c(φ1 + φ2) +
1
2
h1]η + φ1h1η
2 + [c(φ1 + φ2)φ2 + φ2h2]ηξ +
1
2
(φ1 + µ)φ2h2η
3
+φ1φ2h1η
2ξ +
1
2
(φ1 + µ)φ
2
2h2η
2ξ2 + φ22µh2η
2ξ2,
B = [
1
2
h2 + c(φ1 + φ2)]ξ + φ1h1ηξ + φ2h2µηξ
2,
C =
1
2
(h1η + φ2h2η
2 + φ21h2η
2ξ),
D = h2η + φ2h2ηξ,
E =
1
2
h2ξ.
Proof. Denote by C(x1, x2) the expected total fixed cost generated by this queueing
system starting from initial state (x1, x2) until state (0, 0) is reached for the first time.
Then
C(x1, x2) = c(φ1 +φ2)[x1E(B1)+(x2 +E(K))E(B2)] = c(φ1 +φ2)[(1+φ2ξ)ηx1 +ξx2].
(4.38)
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The total cost J(x1, x2) can be written as the sum of three parts as follows
J(x1, x2) = H1(x1, x2) + H2(x1, x2) + C(x1, x2). (4.39)
Substituting (4.22), (4.28), and (4.38) into (4.39), after some algebra, one can show
(4.37) holds.
We also have
τ(x1, x2) = x1E(B1) + (x2 + E(K))E(B2).
Plugging in (4.20), (4.32), and (4.35), we get
τ(x1, x2) =
x1 + x2
µ− φ1 − φ2
. (4.40)
Substituting (4.16), (4.37), and (4.40) into (4.18) and (4.19), Theorem 15 follows
after some algebra.
4.3 Simulation Study
Although we have the optimal splitting probabilities for the OSI policy and the closed-
form expressions for the indices of the GJSQ policy, calculating the expected costs
of these policies for the original warranty repair allocation problem is analytically
intractable. Therefore, we use simulation to evaluate the performance of these two
policies and compare them with two other heuristics. All four heuristics are described
below.
• Join the Shortest Queue policy (JSQ): An incoming failed item is sent
to the vendor with the shortest repair queue (i.e., the least number of items of
both types). If more than one vendor has the shortest queue, among those the
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item is sent to the one with the smallest fixed cost. In case a tie still exists, it
is broken arbitrarily.
• Optimal State-Independent policy (OSI): Incoming failed items are routed
according to the optimal Bernoulli splitting probabilities (p∗1, p
∗
2) as given in
(4.8).
• Tracking (T): An incoming failed type k item is sent to the vendor at which
the expected number of type k items under policy (p∗1, p
∗
2) minus the number
of existing type k items is the largest, i.e., keep the number of failed items at
each vendor as close as possible to the expected number of failed items under
the OSI policy.
• Generalized Join the Shortest Queue policy (GJSQ): An incoming failed
type k item is sent to the vendor with the smallest type k index. The indices
are defined in (4.18) and (4.19).
Our simulation programs were written in SIMSCRIPT II.5, and we use LA-
BATCH.2 (Fishman [14]) to calculate the 95% confidence intervals of the average
cost. Each simulation collects data from 2,000 independent replications. Each repli-
cation runs for a duration of 5 years and outputs the average yearly cost.
Following Opp, Kulkarni, and Glazebrook [37], we use Gini coefficient (Gini [15])
as a measure of the uniformity of the optimal state-independent allocation, which is
connected to the performance of the GJSQ policy. The Gini coefficient is widely used
in the economic literature as a measure of income inequality. It is a number between 0
and 1, where 0 corresponds to perfect equality and 1 corresponds to perfect inequality.
We use it to measure the inequality of the distribution of repairs among vendors.
The Gini coefficient is calculated using the Lorenz curve (Lorenz [29]), which is
a graphical representation of income inequality. In the context of warranty repair
allocation, it can be explained as follows. Let x-axis correspond to the percentage
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of vendors and y-axis correspond to the percentage of repair allocation. The Lorenz
curve is a piecewise linear function that contains point (x, y) if the bottom x% of
vendors have y% of the total repairs (see Figure 4.2). In the case of perfect equality,
every vendor gets the same number of repairs and the Lorenz curve becomes the 45◦
line, which is called the perfect equality line. The Gini coefficient is the ratio between
the area enclosed by the perfect equality line and the Lorenz curve, and the total area
under the perfect equality line.
We illustrate the concepts of Lorenz curve and Gini coefficient using a small
warranty repair allocation example. Suppose three vendors provide repair services for
two types of items. Sales of type 1 items form a PP (100) and sales of type 2 items
form a PP (300). The warranty length and failure rate are the same for both types
of items. The optimal state-independent policy is (p∗1, p
∗
2), with p
∗
1 = (0.2, 0.6, 0.2)
and p∗2 = (0.1, 0.5, 0.4). We measure the distribution inequality among vendors in
terms of total number of repairs (of both types) assigned. Therefore, on average the
percentage of total repairs assigned to vendor 1, 2, and 3 are 12.5%, 52.5%, and 35%,
respectively. Sorting the vendors in ascending order of repair assignment, we can
see that the lowest (33.3%) vendor gets 12.5% of the total assignment, the lowest
two (66.7%) vendors get 47.5% of the total assignment, and the lowest three (100%)
vendors get 100% of the total assignment. Therefore, the Lorenz curve is a piecewise
linear function that connects points (0, 0), (33.3, 12.5), (66.7, 47.5), and (100, 100) as
shown in Figure 4.2.
In general, suppose there are V vendors providing repair services for K classes of
items. Failures from class k items occur according to PP (φk), k = 1, 2, · · · , K, and the
optimal state-independent policy is (p∗1, p
∗
2, · · · , p
∗
K), where p
∗
k = (p
∗
k1, p
∗
k2, · · · , p
∗
kV ).
Then the Gini coefficient can be calculated using the following formula:
G =
∑V
i=j+1
∑V
j=1 |
∑K
k=1 φkp
∗
ki −
∑K
k=1 φkp
∗
kj|
V
∑K
k=1 φk
.
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Figure 4.2: Lorenz curve and perfect equality line
Next we present the simulation results as a function of the Gini coefficient of the
optimal state-independent allocation.
We simulate a system with 2 types of items and 3 vendors. Sales of each type
of items occur according to a Poisson process with rate 200 items per year. Both
types of items are covered under warranty for 1 year and have a failure rate of 1.5
failures per item per year. The holding cost rates are the same across all vendors
with h1i = 500, h2i = 300, i = 1, 2, 3. The fixed cost at each vendor is randomly
generated from distribution U [20, 150]. A total service rate is randomly generated
from distribution U [605, 1210] and is randomly distributed among 3 vendors. Note
that the total service rate is guaranteed to be larger than the expected total fail-
ure rate, therefore the system is always stable. Since there are only 3 vendors,
the Gini coefficient of the optimal state-independent allocation ranges from 0 to 2
3
.
30 random examples are generated for each of the following Gini coefficient ranges:
[0, 0.1), [0.1, 0, 2), · · · , [0.5, 0.6), and 20 random examples are generated for Gini co-
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efficient rage [0.6, 2
3
]. Call cases with Gini coefficient < 0.5 non-extreme cases, and
those with Gini coefficient ≥ 0.5 extreme cases.
Tables 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 summarize the cost reductions by using the GJSQ policy
instead of the other three heuristics. These tables show the minimum, maximum,
and mean percent cost reductions among all 200 cases, among the 150 non-extreme
cases, and among the 50 extreme cases. As we can see that on average the GJSQ
policy performs better than the other heuristics, and there are instances for which the
GJSQ policy provides remarkably significant savings over the other heuristics. The
cost reduction provided by the GJSQ policy is even larger (except for the maximum
and mean reductions over JSQ) when restricted to the non-extreme cases. There are
a small number of instances for which the GJSQ policy costs slightly more than the
other heuristics, most of which are extreme cases.
Figure 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 plot the percent cost reductions against Gini coefficients of
the optimal state-independent allocations. A straight line is fitted to the data points
using the ROBUSTFIT function provided by MATLAB, which uses robust linear
regression that is less sensitive to outliers in the data as compared with ordinary least
squares regression. Plots 4.4 and 4.5 (corresponding to OSI and T, respectively) show
a downward trend in savings as Gini coefficient increases. Plot 4.3 (corresponding
to JSQ) shows a slightly upward trend. These observations are consistent with the
results summarized in the tables.
Table 4.2 shows the comparison results between the GJSQ policy and the JSQ
policy. Among all 200 cases, the GJSQ policy provides an average cost saving of
9.85% over the JSQ policy. Since the JSQ policy tends to allocate items evenly
among vendors, it is expected to perform very poorly in extreme cases. In another
word, the GJSQ policy has a greater chance to provide large cost reduction over the
JSQ policy in extreme cases. This intuition explains the fact that, when restricted
to non-extreme cases, the minimum reduction improves but the maximum and mean
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reductions reduce. Plot 4.3 shows the upward trend although it is not statistically
significant. Out of the 150 non-extreme cases, the GJSQ policy provides positive
cost reductions in 139 cases. Out of the 50 extreme cases, the GJSQ policy provides
positive cost reductions in 20 cases. The negative cost savings are all relatively small
(-2.13% in the worst case), while the positive cost savings can be very large (up to
63.5%). As a result, although the GJSQ policy gives negative savings in 60% of the
extreme cases, the average cost saving among extreme cases is still positive (14.30%).
Cases with Cases with
All cases Gini coefficient < 0.5 Gini coefficient ≥ 0.5
Min. reduction -2.15% -1.19% -2.15%
Max. reduction 63.54% 48.83% 63.50%
Mean reduction 9.85% 8.37% 14.30%
Table 4.2: Cost reduction of GJSQ over JSQ
Table 4.3 shows the comparison results between the GJSQ policy and the OSI
policy. Among all 200 cases, the GJSQ policy provides an average cost saving of
3.49% over the OSI policy. Among the 150 non-extreme cases, the average cost
saving is 4.57%. Plot 4.4 shows the downward trend which is statistically significant
at 99% level. The GJSQ policy provides positive cost reductions in all non-extreme
cases. Out of the 50 extreme cases, the GJSQ policy provides positive cost reductions
in 47 cases. One may argue that the GJSQ policy should never perform worse than
the OSI policy, since it improves on top of the optimal state-independent policy by
applying a single step of policy improvement. However, when calculating the indices,
we ignored the dynamics of the system by assuming the number of functioning items
under warranty stays constant and is always the expected number of items under
warranty in steady state. This simplifying assumption as well as the error introduced
by simulation cause the seemingly lawbreaking behavior.
Table 4.4 shows the comparison results between the GJSQ policy and the T policy.
Among all 200 cases, the GJSQ policy provides an average cost saving of 4.23% over
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Cases with Cases with
All cases Gini coefficient < 0.5 Gini coefficient ≥ 0.5
Min. reduction -3.05% 0.098% -3.05%
Max. reduction 18.24% 18.24% 7.79%
Mean reduction 3.49% 4.57% 0.24%
Table 4.3: Cost reduction of GJSQ over OSI
the T policy. Among the 150 non-extreme cases, the average cost saving is 4.87%.
Plot 4.5 shows the downward trend which is statistically significant at 99% level. The
GJSQ policy provides positive cost reductions in all non-extreme cases. Out of the
50 extreme cases, the GJSQ policy provides positive cost reductions in 33 cases.
Cases with Cases with
All cases Gini coefficient < 0.5 Gini coefficient ≥ 0.5
Min. reduction -2.16% 0.007% -2.16%
Max. reduction 21.98% 21.98% 15.65%
Mean reduction 4.23% 4.87% 2.31%
Table 4.4: Cost reduction of GJSQ over T
From the above observations we can see that the GJSQ policy is a very robust and
efficient algorithm. It beats the other heuristics on average even when considering
only the extreme cases. It can provide significant cost savings over the other heuristics
in many cases (up to 63.54% over JSQ, 18.24% over OSI, and 21.98% over T). In the
worst case among our 800 random examples, the GJSQ policy costs only 3.05% more.
92
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
C
os
t R
ed
uc
tio
n 
(%
)
Gini Coefficient
y = 6.40 + 3.72x
p−value = 0.2146
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future Work
5.1 Conclusions
We studied two problems motivated by the prioritized warranty repair outsourcing
problem: the admission control problem to a single vendor and the routing problem
to multiple vendors.
We considered two cases of the admission control problem. In Chapter 2, we dis-
cussed the case where the reward is generated at the time of joinning the repair queue.
Modelling the single repair vendor as a two-class M/M/1 queueing system with fixed
priorities, we analyzed the optimal policies under three criteria, i.e., individual op-
timization, class optimization, and social optimization, and showed that they are
characterized by either critical numbers or monotone switching curves. We also com-
pared different policies and showed that the class-optimal policy accepts more high
priority customers and fewer low priority customers than the socially optimal policy.
Compared with either socially optimal policy or class-optimal policy, the individually
optimal policy accepts more high priority customers, while it may accept either more
or fewer low priority customers. In Chapter 3, we considered the case where the
reward is generated at the time of service completion. Using sample path argument,
we proved that the optimal control policies have the same structural properties as
in the first case. We compared different policies numerically. The numerical results
suggest the same relationships as in the first case.
In Chapter 4, we addressed the problem of dynamically routing prioritized war-
ranty repairs to multiple vendors. We developed an index-based heuristic which is
developed by performing a single step of dynamic programming policy improvement
on an optimal state-independent policy. After deriving closed-form expressions for
the indices, we evaluated the index policy and compared it with three other heuristics
using simulation. The simulation results suggest that the index policy is a robust, ef-
ficient algorithm. It can provide a significant cost reduction over the other heuristics,
especially when the optimal state-independent allocation is relatively uniform among
vendors.
5.2 Future Work
Admission Control
(1) The structural results for the individually optimal policy and the class-optimal
policy can be extended to an M/M/s queue with class-dependent service rates
by following similar approaches. The extension of the results for the socially
optimal policy is more complicated and requires future work.
(2) We have proved the results for the socially optimal policy under assumption
h1 ≥ h2. Both intuition and numerical experiments suggest that the results are
still true when h1 < h2. However, it remains to prove them rigorously.
(3) Extend the results to M/M/1 queues with more than two priority classes.
(4) Prove the comparison results analytically using sample path argument.
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Warranty Repair Routing
(1) Extend the results to problems with n types of items. The algorithm for finding
the optimal state-independent policy can be easily extended to n types of items
(See Buczkowski et al. [9]) . Unfortunately, generalizing our method to derive
the indices requires future work.
(2) If, for some reason, the real-time state information of the vendors is not avail-
able, one has to use partially state-dependent policies, i.e., decisions are only
based on the real-time information of the warranty population (numbers of
items under warranty, and the remaining warranty period for each item). What
is a good policy in this case? We expect that an index-based partially state-
dependent policy can be developed by following a similar approach.
(3) We have been assuming the repair fees are exogenous and given. We haven’t
answered the question of how these prices are chosen. Game theoretic models
can be used to address this question. Assuming the vendors compete with each
other in setting prices and service rates, one can model the competition among
vendors as a Nash game and the contracting between the manufacturer and
the vendors as a Stackelberg game. The existence (perhaps uniqueness) of the
Stackelberg equilibria and Nash equilibria is desirable.
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Appendix
The parameters (fixed costs c1, c2, c3 and service rates µ1, µ2, µ3) for the simulation
studies in Chapter 4 are given in this appendix.
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Table 1: Simulation parameters (Trials 1-25)
Trial c1 c2 c3 µ1 µ2 µ3
1 138.70 91.99 78.09 432.33 210.43 240.53
2 84.30 73.63 57.70 549.80 223.60 290.45
3 41.13 113.79 93.61 248.33 496.70 216.22
4 116.02 129.28 23.35 313.82 419.20 217.97
5 30.74 41.11 146.88 236.29 200.16 661.62
6 112.68 147.20 105.72 169.30 229.80 222.49
7 50.40 105.09 53.99 252.60 274.23 211.22
8 140.96 25.76 140.03 349.58 227.55 273.39
9 128.51 67.67 36.69 326.78 184.57 275.45
10 122.58 66.70 48.76 432.42 259.27 204.21
11 27.74 80.75 37.72 212.42 467.34 237.25
12 101.53 109.64 39.60 268.95 356.05 254.24
13 79.32 62.83 87.97 318.45 222.77 510.01
14 101.80 79.31 107.17 194.95 213.26 254.51
15 107.19 64.26 60.27 485.51 243.74 189.92
16 40.92 96.23 68.57 291.06 283.35 302.85
17 82.82 147.84 113.85 322.43 220.63 191.33
18 86.41 118.44 32.21 196.12 559.56 181.64
19 43.54 45.92 118.52 159.19 200.01 272.56
20 85.79 36.82 39.01 551.80 360.01 167.79
21 50.91 112.02 135.14 236.32 329.31 197.79
22 128.23 125.42 39.05 321.77 199.66 242.92
23 107.42 41.52 31.89 212.59 288.96 143.27
24 30.01 49.23 122.04 217.02 290.60 376.40
25 43.63 79.93 110.91 319.07 239.52 217.06
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Table 2: Simulation parameters (Trials 26-50)
Trial c1 c2 c3 µ1 µ2 µ3
26 86.73 76.18 101.79 206.71 191.45 302.09
27 20.38 76.10 32.52 241.16 581.60 164.67
28 92.85 145.95 52.15 199.43 568.94 194.44
29 132.05 78.37 99.94 393.25 281.13 286.78
30 22.87 72.27 92.98 282.94 138.63 538.66
31 62.43 39.85 47.46 618.63 356.90 61.27
32 83.47 77.91 82.15 237.20 400.81 411.10
33 113.20 118.75 147.30 345.24 223.64 148.89
34 83.17 127.55 148.96 395.38 120.07 150.80
35 81.31 91.78 140.46 361.85 79.38 412.06
36 120.26 74.98 29.32 731.12 114.62 224.36
37 46.83 98.38 96.99 335.77 145.56 321.80
38 126.46 117.43 96.65 384.19 451.01 177.22
39 38.79 138.69 109.34 46.90 331.97 279.44
40 33.33 110.09 107.73 102.77 196.51 376.90
41 134.90 60.60 98.94 525.89 86.01 331.23
42 85.37 112.23 75.76 384.71 458.54 170.52
43 88.70 56.18 59.73 332.43 76.46 329.47
44 69.17 141.40 127.72 373.75 536.11 118.38
45 123.33 101.15 21.11 397.51 297.61 343.38
46 27.22 33.11 49.86 41.39 291.35 723.54
47 123.51 104.60 37.17 21.92 352.38 294.08
48 95.65 34.14 41.23 309.75 7.87 315.52
49 116.24 141.99 74.31 493.35 70.87 345.91
50 107.44 132.08 87.22 294.23 652.97 28.72
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Table 3: Simulation parameters (Trials 51-75)
Trial c1 c2 c3 µ1 µ2 µ3
51 108.18 87.30 70.33 406.62 3.43 357.65
52 114.05 31.49 73.05 600.08 28.43 250.91
53 34.05 116.85 109.74 357.28 157.53 338.04
54 105.47 63.16 138.65 403.57 27.90 213.96
55 81.77 118.86 30.72 411.82 172.79 209.86
56 120.00 93.57 38.61 149.38 212.10 387.22
57 93.34 138.29 57.14 446.35 353.19 204.66
58 77.20 146.70 107.38 435.00 397.67 62.60
59 149.80 147.49 75.37 7.74 772.33 273.18
60 140.82 99.12 138.39 78.72 191.58 362.58
61 125.13 58.46 88.15 389.88 464.43 17.99
62 97.90 48.61 33.43 245.14 286.59 441.04
63 120.75 127.69 138.07 124.25 449.69 42.70
64 144.73 128.13 56.03 758.27 9.33 242.27
65 25.04 59.54 123.00 491.05 97.93 432.58
66 83.45 41.09 103.22 522.32 493.99 25.02
67 92.19 45.93 62.14 325.66 51.75 527.98
68 78.49 47.09 60.77 41.63 299.09 807.02
69 138.48 106.07 129.16 552.11 442.18 12.77
70 119.13 33.62 105.18 521.09 62.60 142.78
71 136.57 115.93 29.56 982.85 94.95 108.44
72 116.61 147.54 75.70 538.62 3.03 422.76
73 111.36 91.05 77.83 410.45 219.03 478.62
74 103.41 70.14 34.38 192.33 578.70 204.75
75 21.66 140.67 40.04 519.18 218.09 308.55
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Table 4: Simulation parameters (Trials 76-100)
Trial c1 c2 c3 µ1 µ2 µ3
76 102.42 137.01 79.78 149.34 397.56 580.95
77 49.07 41.62 33.22 191.84 635.11 14.57
78 82.92 21.23 73.21 561.07 563.16 32.95
79 137.16 125.20 85.37 65.74 171.40 527.12
80 35.12 25.46 113.06 552.50 29.89 171.04
81 32.50 41.73 69.67 598.89 288.57 73.98
82 33.31 78.26 118.36 25.75 115.35 977.76
83 110.8 136.53 34.63 224.06 80.96 520.11
84 72.16 95.04 82.82 590.29 405.04 101.00
85 114.79 83.10 92.83 481.99 578.85 117.83
86 21.55 68.40 66.05 83.47 751.78 49.65
87 49.41 141.23 116.54 503.98 249.35 431.86
88 28.31 84.59 80.04 105.71 104.18 882.37
89 108.91 139.89 145.83 599.21 139.36 50.27
90 34.24 27.92 110.95 665.24 201.24 4.16
91 81.07 50.77 127.61 37.54 636.92 121.78
92 39.64 48.33 73.16 637.19 15.54 42.07
93 26.60 68.72 136.51 607.62 126.4 108.59
94 27.96 51.28 63.68 20.98 19.65 779.34
95 56.59 140.63 39.72 29.41 29.08 702.77
96 20.35 59.22 30.87 6.65 149.91 764.46
97 83.87 129.58 67.81 277.73 208.13 664.11
98 29.71 128.20 57.19 53.50 187.08 774.19
99 23.12 109.97 130.09 775.91 198.74 118.43
100 37.15 98.41 121.58 54.10 852.23 52.73
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Table 5: Simulation parameters (Trials 101-125)
Trial c1 c2 c3 µ1 µ2 µ3
101 131.80 130.98 97.16 263.17 222.24 210.12
102 26.00 59.62 125.80 228.34 197.19 668.94
103 114.04 51.17 83.68 607.03 179.16 288.71
104 115.39 98.31 27.40 420.51 290.69 204.42
105 97.67 109.08 146.60 289.62 199.91 305.51
106 39.39 105.91 50.80 253.45 248.19 165.03
107 62.46 54.43 86.34 241.51 155.06 219.12
108 23.67 99.50 88.11 235.01 170.00 211.45
109 24.43 61.52 145.02 248.15 176.84 238.78
110 36.03 86.62 32.50 208.45 269.46 195.49
111 103.61 24.87 136.31 280.88 191.04 549.23
112 54.83 125.18 73.67 253.94 687.56 227.10
113 69.56 75.14 84.67 229.10 305.50 583.73
114 52.39 145.35 65.21 255.82 513.22 254.89
115 50.18 79.91 24.60 250.17 554.16 258.16
116 92.74 71.70 142.94 323.29 228.38 395.46
117 60.62 137.48 110.36 332.40 225.44 202.03
118 104.48 20.87 21.43 184.34 234.90 308.81
119 117.55 46.75 32.32 665.92 132.39 321.64
120 24.03 33.53 27.95 185.03 353.34 320.69
121 93.01 147.68 123.83 282.25 209.88 138.95
122 21.64 94.05 80.04 259.18 625.49 191.23
123 138.98 83.84 117.29 385.59 324.66 156.60
124 148.11 75.87 134.39 367.62 112.02 301.88
125 146.96 33.67 66.61 272.84 210.26 158.89
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Table 6: Simulation parameters (Trials 126-150)
Trial c1 c2 c3 µ1 µ2 µ3
126 73.44 113.74 115.01 168.56 520.73 369.77
127 62.00 98.58 50.66 181.47 643.10 341.65
128 146.76 77.16 62.94 291.20 274.86 175.70
129 75.13 91.23 119.52 157.21 278.75 706.91
130 143.82 65.38 108.12 223.55 147.69 264.07
131 80.69 89.27 100.12 159.38 409.84 305.55
132 132.32 79.35 112.64 174.02 254.09 352.56
133 142.32 52.28 109.82 413.63 105.59 385.22
134 67.67 77.84 63.06 56.62 297.85 336.12
135 118.41 99.98 37.64 96.93 202.63 360.91
136 124.97 139.99 116.66 195.08 632.53 158.81
137 48.26 105.69 87.68 296.31 263.03 69.95
138 53.90 120.28 136.79 244.84 129.16 739.33
139 68.06 66.24 69.79 167.03 453.56 347.27
140 139.29 60.07 112.45 625.75 95.74 312.71
141 31.66 83.84 110.00 322.72 290.42 206.33
142 22.90 81.41 122.07 256.36 114.56 397.06
143 114.09 50.90 23.95 289.44 390.23 154.07
144 108.15 127.22 70.97 374.57 333.78 240.01
145 31.09 125.56 27.70 156.54 425.36 146.39
146 93.36 88.09 52.70 523.42 108.49 197.03
147 22.28 145.84 129.62 380.59 93.99 726.55
148 27.66 35.44 135.56 31.16 263.37 554.11
149 107.97 25.56 138.87 374.90 30.29 240.64
150 109.96 32.20 61.68 202.91 419.38 130.56
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Table 7: Simulation parameters (Trials 151-175)
Trial c1 c2 c3 µ1 µ2 µ3
151 106.05 141.84 146.34 459.88 281.08 348.45
152 56.36 129.62 58.57 89.24 453.24 89.22
153 100.94 146.47 146.90 279.73 624.37 253.17
154 21.07 123.24 37.08 89.92 461.63 158.50
155 84.89 78.83 101.97 344.50 450.06 242.49
156 25.08 27.99 57.36 77.30 214.69 652.39
157 121.12 76.00 64.40 386.67 464.50 98.64
158 123.86 52.97 23.82 150.33 401.00 95.90
159 92.05 130.37 32.93 378.69 83.68 378.46
160 115.27 84.44 83.84 0.67 382.55 284.76
161 45.62 147.01 136.87 222.66 111.46 543.99
162 35.05 133.98 132.30 129.86 339.69 723.83
163 57.07 32.67 141.14 177.25 4.47 480.82
164 52.54 63.48 123.85 488.04 657.17 50.91
165 60.64 120.05 121.64 182.67 816.70 68.99
166 135.92 81.23 26.23 131.26 17.41 461.42
167 123.99 79.51 37.88 72.27 485.41 504.78
168 83.59 89.08 57.38 48.64 216.72 497.02
169 86.63 102.64 117.01 484.20 138.29 42.50
170 24.92 57.24 72.32 225.76 766.39 59.98
171 82.14 22.61 89.60 78.46 505.42 576.34
172 93.81 68.96 25.73 668.37 76.24 134.25
173 119.24 52.95 135.48 97.76 53.79 465.82
174 44.51 25.04 140.74 456.00 50.51 140.33
175 94.10 146.10 110.56 540.25 279.26 360.44
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Table 8: Simulation parameters (Trials 176-200)
Trial c1 c2 c3 µ1 µ2 µ3
176 69.04 61.73 91.98 539.96 183.18 386.49
177 146.32 39.77 82.64 929.24 44.29 27.73
178 102.97 95.83 92.02 131.30 233.89 639.96
179 135.66 125.52 105.14 409.75 681.27 80.54
180 41.18 104.35 96.93 582.34 10.45 134.83
181 144.22 114.56 75.12 126.67 144.18 542.19
182 23.13 138.35 41.32 17.11 723.85 63.99
183 44.02 23.05 137.94 110.26 565.65 98.31
184 129.53 35.76 62.55 273.84 80.15 594.45
185 78.05 83.83 37.40 960.44 140.20 97.99
186 78.64 89.01 135.78 566.76 162.18 451.87
187 143.25 97.90 54.61 54.25 422.81 546.85
188 72.54 103.44 57.01 814.96 85.90 193.26
189 130.21 109.42 130.12 374.15 599.27 187.69
190 72.07 38.06 101.09 568.69 32.01 75.29
191 23.57 110.36 54.93 36.65 396.08 628.03
192 125.50 24.03 108.81 280.60 763.48 77.31
193 103.84 126.34 105.83 741.87 70.56 90.50
194 143.51 138.03 122.57 51.45 89.54 962.01
195 135.75 87.02 103.39 129.10 65.34 924.16
196 94.20 59.74 62.17 208.13 702.09 100.76
197 108.86 122.93 103.68 34.60 290.52 859.97
198 38.22 22.81 81.42 94.36 670.96 273.41
199 103.56 90.82 109.62 984.01 94.94 31.71
200 63.63 144.13 122.21 607.90 13.74 40.62
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